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Abstract 
 
Recent amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act emphasize efforts toward 
safeguarding our nation’s water supplies against attack and contamination. 
Specifically, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 established requirements for each community water system serving more 
than 3300 people to conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of its system to a 
terrorist attack or other intentional acts.  Integral to evaluating system vulnerability is 
the threat assessment, which is the process by which the credibility of a threat is 
quantified. Unfortunately, full probabilistic assessment is generally not feasible, as 
there is insufficient experience and/or data to quantify the associated probabilities.  
For this reason, an alternative approach is proposed based on Markov Latent Effects 
(MLE) modeling, which provides a framework for quantifying imprecise subjective 
metrics through possibilistic or fuzzy mathematics. Here, an MLE model for water 
systems is developed and demonstrated to determine threat assessments for different 
scenarios identified by the assailant, asset, and means.  Scenario assailants include 
terrorists, insiders, and vandals.  Assets include a water treatment plant, water storage 
tank, node, pipeline, well, and a pump station.  Means used in attacks include 
contamination (onsite chemicals, biological and chemical), explosives and vandalism.  
Results demonstrated highest threats are vandalism events and least likely events are 
those performed by a terrorist. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
There are approximately 160,000 public drinking water systems in the United States.  Each of 
these systems supplies water to at least 15 connections or 25 people.  Most people in the US (268 
million) get their water from a community water system.  There are approximately 54,000 
community water systems but seven percent (3,797 systems) serve 81 percent of the people 
(EPA Factoids, 2004). The ability of these utilities to deliver safe, clean water is essential to 
public health, economic growth, and quality of life. 
 
In 1996, an executive order (E.O. 13010) on critical infrastructure protection included water 
supply systems as one of eight national infrastructures vital to the security of the United States.  
In 1997, the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection identified 
vulnerabilities in the drinking water sector and identified three attributes crucial to water supply 
users: water must be available on demand, it must be delivered at sufficient pressure, and it must 
be safe for use (The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997).  As a 
result of these findings, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), other federal agencies, 
water utilities, and state and local governments have taken steps to improve the security of water 
systems.  In 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 that 
established a private/public partnership to put in place prevention, response, and recovery 
methods to ensure the security of the nation’s critical infrastructures against criminal or terrorist 
attacks.  This directive assigned the responsibility for improving preparedness and increasing 
security of drinking water systems and supplies to the Environmental Protection Agency (The 
Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure, 1998).  
 
The events of September 11, 2001 had the effect of broadening and accelerating efforts to 
safeguard the nation’s water utilities against terrorism and other threats.  In particular, President 
Bush signed into law the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 (HR3448 Public Law 107-188).  This law added new drinking water security and 
safety requirements and required all community water systems serving more than 3300 people to 
complete vulnerability assessments and prepare and/or update their emergency response plans.  
The vulnerability assessments intended to help water utilities evaluate the risk posed by potential 
threats and identify corrective actions that could reduce or mitigate the consequences of these 
adversarial actions (Scharfenaker, 2002).  These assessments were to serve as a guide to the 
water utility by providing a prioritized plan for security upgrades modifications of operational 
procedures, and/or policy changes to mitigate risks.  The assessments were intended to be a 
dynamic process in which the utilities review their vulnerability assessments periodically to 
account for changing threats or changes to the water system.  Furthermore, in December of 2003, 
President Bush issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive /HSPD-7, which established 
a national policy for the federal government to identify, prioritize and protect critical 
infrastructures as part of homeland security (Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 2003).   
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1.2. Problem 
 
Water is vital to society.  It is required for transporting goods, growing food, and maintaining 
life.  Since water is such a critical asset, it has been used as a means of harming others in times 
of war or conflict.  It has been reported that as far back as the sixth century BC, Assyrians 
implemented bioterrorism into their war strategy by poisoning enemy wells with rye ergot, a 
fungus that causes convulsions if ingested (Eitzen 1997).  It has also been reported that in 1993 
Saddam Hussein of Iraq poisoned and drained the water supplies of Shiite Muslims as a military 
tool to suppress their opposition to his government (Gleick 1993).   
 
The American Water Works Association Research Foundation completed a study in February 
2003 to assemble a database of security incidents, threats and hoaxes involving water systems.  
This study yielded 264 events; where 193 occurred in North America.  (Welter et. al., 2003).  
Although these instances have occurred over time, it was not until the terrorist attacks in the 
United States on September 11 2001, that the security of water distribution systems fell under 
scrutiny.  Moreover, in the January 2001 report of the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, ongoing water research was characterized as a small effort that left a 
number of gaps and shortfalls relative to U.S. water supplies (Critical Infrastructure Assurance 
Office, 2001).  It also went on to state, “that gaps exist in four major areas  
 
• Threat/vulnerability risk analysis 
• Identification and characterization of biological and chemical agents 
• A need to establish a center of excellence to support communities in conducting 
vulnerability and risk assessment, and 
• Application of information assurance techniques to computerized systems used by 
water utilities, as well as the oil, gas, and electric sectors for operational data and 
control operations.”  
 
Since EPA is the lead agency for protecting the nation’s drinking and wastewater infrastructure, 
they have developed the “Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan” (EPA, 
2004) that addresses drinking water supply, water treatment, water storage, and drinking water 
distribution infrastructure.  The key research and technical support needs listed in the plan to 
enhance protection of water infrastructure are: 
 
• “Identify and characterize threats that could be used to disrupt water systems 
• Develop methods for detecting and monitoring contaminants in water 
• Create rapid screening technologies for the identification of unknown 
contaminants 
• Improve detectors and early warning systems for water distribution and collection 
systems 
• Enhance models for contaminant transport in pipes and distribution systems 
• Test and evaluate the performance of sensors and biomonitors 
• Refine fate and transport information for contaminants in water 
• Develop treatment or inactivation techniques for water contaminants 
• Evaluate and improve decontamination and disposal techniques for contaminated 
materials and equipment 
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• Establish contingency planning and infrastructure backup procedures 
• Improve methods for assessing risks to the public from water contamination 
• Enhance risk communication and information sharing among individuals and 
organizations dealing with a threat of attack 
• Provide training and exercises that enhance preparedness, response, and 
mitigation to water system threats or attacks”  
 
Thus, defining the threat to water systems was not only listed in the Critical Infrastructure 
Commission as a major issue, it was also the first action item listed for the EPA in its plan to 
make water systems safer.   
 
Furthermore, there are currently no federal standards or agreed upon industry best practices 
within the water infrastructure sector to govern readiness, response to security incidents, or 
recovery.  EPA is not authorized to require water infrastructure systems to implement specific 
security improvements or meet particular security standards, although efforts to develop 
voluntary protocols and tools have been ongoing (Copeland & Cody, 2005).   
 
There have been some efforts to develop methods to determine vulnerabilities of water utilities; 
however, the actual threat to water utilities has not been determined.  Threat assessment is a 
procedure for determining the credibility or seriousness of a threat.  It attempts to determine the 
likelihood that a threat will be carried out and the likelihood that the system/asset being attacked 
is able to defend against the attack (Skiba & Peterson, 2003).  Conversely, a vulnerability 
assessment evaluates the susceptibility to potential threats and identifies corrective actions that 
can reduce or mitigate the risks of serious consequences from adversarial actions and it considers 
risks posed to the surrounding community because of the attack (EPA, 2002).  The following 
section provides information on the current approaches to these areas.   
 
1.3. Current Approaches to Threat Assessment 
 
Following the presidential commission’s findings, Haimes and others (1998) reviewed needs and 
opportunities to reduce the vulnerability of public water systems to willful attack.  They 
developed a hierarchical holographic model (Haimes, 1981) to better understand the complexity 
and interconnectedness that characterizes the security of water distribution systems.  This model 
was also used to explore different approaches to hardening (in terms of security, robustness, 
resilience, and redundancy) water distribution systems against attack.  Subsequent to this work, 
Ezell and others introduced an infrastructure risk analysis model (Ezell et al., 2000a) and applied 
it within the context of a municipal water distribution system (Ezell, 2000b).  The model 
provides an analytical methodology for quantifying risk that involves decomposition of utility 
operations along the dimensions of function, component, structure, state, and vulnerability.  
Potential threats were identified through scenario modeling, while conditional and expected 
losses for each scenario are calculated via Asbeck and Haimes’s (1984) partitioned 
multiobjective risk method.  
 
Other models that have been developed include Haestad Methods contaminant transport model 
WaterSAFE® (Haestad Methods, 2005) and the US Air Force H2OMAP (Boulos, 2002).  These 
models focused on contaminant transport, identifying customer impacts, determining 
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contaminant origination, flushing techniques, fire flow availability, and methods for isolating the 
contaminant.  These models do not determine threat assessments, but how to respond to events 
that might occur.  Moreover, since these models only considered the actual system components 
of a water utility they do not take into account other factors that can lead up to a successful 
attack.  For example, how aware (or unaware) the water utility personnel are with respect to the 
security of the utility. Finally, the models depend on probabilities of events where there is little 
data associated with events, therefore making actual probabilities difficult to quantify.   
 
To assist the water utility industry in conducting the vulnerability assessments that were required 
by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, EPA in 
partnership with the American Water Works Association Research Foundation and Sandia 
National Laboratories developed the Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities (RAM-
WTM) (AWWA, 2002).  This performance-based, consequence-driven, risk–management tool 
aids in identifying system vulnerabilities, identifying critical facilities and assets, and 
determining the level of protection to which the security system should be designed.  This 
approach is performance-based meaning that it evaluates risk based on the effectiveness of the 
security system against malevolent acts.  Central to the methodology is the evaluation of risk,  
 
 R = Pa (1− Pe)C      (1) 
 
where R is risk, Pa is the probability of attack, Pe is the probability of system effectiveness, and 
C is the consequence.  Operationally, risk is determined through a coordinated consequence 
analysis (to define C) and threat assessment (for quantifying the term Pa(1-Pe)).  According to 
this approach, risk assessment is performed primarily through a process of expert elicitation in 
which values for each term in the risk equation are quantified according to a structured and 
defined on a scale of high, medium or low.  In this way, RAM-WTM is designed to facilitate 
comparative analyses relying on relative rankings determined from the risk equation.  However, 
in RAM-W, the Pa value is always set to one, therefore the overall equation is driven only by 
consequence and system effectiveness and not the actual likelihood of an attack.  This is 
important to note, since this methodology assumes that an attack will always occur. 
 
Even before the events of September 11, 2001, water utilities were performing risk-based 
analyses to quantify vulnerabilities to natural events such as earthquakes, floods and other 
natural disasters.  Various methodologies are available for performing these risk assessments 
(e.g., Killuru, 1996; Levitt, 1997). Recently, the American Water Works Association Research 
Foundation conducted a comprehensive review of the experience base with water utility disasters 
and offered guidance for risk management and analysis (Grigg, 2003). “The project showed that 
available methods for risk analysis are in limited use by utilities because of a lack of data on 
threats and vulnerabilities and a lack of training and priority within utilities.”  Similar 
experiences have been encountered by water utilities performing vulnerability assessments, in 
which relevant threat data has been difficult to obtain.  In turn, the utilities are faced with 
decisions concerning risk reduction programs, potentially costing millions of dollars, driven by 
this highly ambiguous data (Danneels and Finley, 2004). 
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These results underscore the difficulty in conducting the threat assessment part of any risk-based 
analysis.  Although the governing relation for threat assessment is quite simple, (Pa(1-Pe) term in 
Equation 1), defining the associated terms is difficult.  The problem is insufficient experience 
and data for quantifying the associated probabilities; particularly in the case of willful attacks.   
 
1.4. Alternative Approach to Risk Assessment 
 
As discussed in the previous section, one of the primary concerns with the current methods of 
conducting vulnerability assessments is that there is little data available to determine actual event 
probabilities.  For this reason, these models assume Pa, the probability of attack value, is one.  
That is, the event will occur.  Furthermore, these models do not take into account outside effects 
that can contribute to whether an attack is successful.   
 
This research presents a possibilistic approach to threat assessment using Markov Latent Effects 
(MLE) as an alternative to the traditional probabilistic modeling methodologies.  MLE modeling 
is a convenient threat assessment framework for analyzing subjective metrics within a 
quantitative, repeatable, and defensible process.  Moreover, MLE modeling provides a means of 
calculating Pa.  This type of modeling can help water utilities determine what threat level they 
want to protect to and what assets have the highest threats.  This type of modeling may also help 
determine best practices and industry standards for water utilities to follow for protection of their 
systems. 
 
1.5. Objectives 
 
The purpose of this research is to develop Markov Latent Effects (MLE) modeling as an 
approach to conduct threat assessments for water systems.  Using a Markov Latent Effects model 
to analyze threats allows one to visualize the network of events that must coincide for a threat to 
achieve its intended purpose.  Since there is not enough data to determine absolute probabilities, 
the MLE method is a convenient threat assessment framework for analyzing subjective metrics 
within a quantitative, repeatable, and defensible process.  These qualities of MLE modeling 
contribute to a defensible decision making process that can be used by water utilities to 
determine where to spend limited funds on infrastructure upgrades, security improvements, etc.  
Furthermore, MLE modeling allows for the term Pa (Possibility of Attack) to be calculated rather 
than setting it directly to one.  This gives a more realistic threat assessment value that can be 
used in the overall risk assessment equation, which enables risk to not only be driven by the 
consequence of the attack but also the other defining terms.   
 
First the fundamental underpinnings of MLE modeling will be described. An MLE model is then 
developed within the context of a water distribution system and presented. Finally, application of 
this approach is demonstrated on a U.S. water utility. 
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2.  METHODS OF APPROACH 
 
The possibilistic framework adopted for water supply system threat assessment is Markov Latent 
Effects modeling (Cooper, 2004).  The following sections provide the theoretical background 
underpinning the MLE model.   
 
2.1. MLE Background 
 
The Markov Latent Effects approach had its genesis in the mid-1990s, following a series of 
accident and security-breach investigations.  These investigations revealed that there were strong 
cultural (e.g., lack of personal responsibility, poor communication, failure to address problems) 
and environmental (poor working conditions, time constraints, pressure to “look good”) factors 
contributing to the events.  Since these factors were generally present at a time well before the 
occurrence of the event, they were termed  “latent effects” (J. Reason, 1997).    Although the 
accident and security-breach investigations identified the need for mathematical treatment of 
these latent effects, their subjective nature defied conventional analysis.  To address this need, 
Cooper (2004) combined the concept of latent effects with a chained subjective analysis 
methodology to formulate the “Markov Latent Effects” modeling framework, named after A. A. 
Markov, who explored (in the late 19th century) the formal mathematical role of a chain of 
occurrences in determining subsequent events (Feller, 1957).  MLE was originally developed for 
assessing the effects of organizational and operational factors on high consequence system safety 
for the Federal Aviation Administration (Cooper, 1999).    
 
In order to give a systemic structure to the approach, a top-down mathematical decomposition 
strategy is employed.  This strategy enables determination of the most appropriate items to be 
measured and aggregated as imprecise subjective numbers through possibilistic mathematics.  
The resulting metrics provide a reference point for assessment and for aiding management 
decisions.  Having a mathematical model to run test cases facilitates predictive exercises and 
helps convey the top-down system perspective, while mathematically portraying the results. 
 
2.2. Decomposition Factors 
 
The obvious focus in any operation is on the results of the operation itself.  However, lying 
behind these operations are modes in which the operation was set up and implemented, the 
management of the operation, and the environment.  A “top-down” approach inverts the focus to 
make sure that potentially important hidden factors are identified and not neglected.  This is best 
accomplished according to the following steps: 
 
1. Recognize environmental constraints and threats 
2. Determine the management philosophy that is established within that environment 
3. Evaluate the working conditions 
4. Assess the risks inherent in actual operation.  (Cooper 2001). 
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This approach helps better identify risks, but more importantly, helps determine why problems 
might arise (a forward-looking approach) and helps identify what can be done to improve overall 
integrity (similar to an in-depth root cause and correction analysis, but also accommodating 
hypothetical events).  
 
The MLE model has a performance-focused approach built around the timing of latent effects.  
These latent effects are identified through decomposition of the complex threat system into 
subsystems that are more manageable or decision elements that trace a particular threat from its 
inception to the point of consequence (Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  MLE Decomposition. 
 
 
In this way, the decomposition helps visualize the network of events that must coincide for a 
threat to achieve its intended consequence.  For example, consider a contamination event 
targeting a treated water storage tank that requires the following set of events: utility budget cuts 
limit security upgrades; failure of utility to protect sensitive system information; poor 
maintenance practices by utility; assailant acquires critical system information; assailant training 
and mission preparation; defeat of the limited physical security protecting the tank; and, 
undetected breach of the tank hatch due to inoperable alarm.  In this way, decomposition 
provides a basis for identifying credible threats and for visualizing all the latent effects that 
contribute to the success of a threat event.  
 
A latent effect is an occurrence, condition, or behavior that does not necessarily cause an 
immediate problem, but can combine later with other occurrences, conditions, or behaviors.  
Latent effects are represented sequentially because of the chained nature of the decomposition.  
As in the example above, a breach of the water supply tank was made possible by a sequence of 
latent effects; specifically, failure of the utility to make security upgrades, protect sensitive 
information and maintenance of the intrusion alarm system.   
 
2.3. Decision Element Structure 
 
Each decision element identified in the decomposition process represents a single factor that 
influences the likelihood that a threat will occur. Each decision element produces an output 
subject to a set of inputs (Figure 1). These inputs include direct effects and/or latent effects.  
Latent Effect
Output 
Decision 
Element 
Direct Effect 
Weighting Factor 
Weighting Factor 
Decision 
Element 
Direct Effect 
Weighting Factor 
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Direct effects are inputs unique to that decision element.  Each direct effect is subjectively 
assigned an attribute value.  Attribute values are qualitative choices, mapped on a scale of 0 
(very weak) to 1 (very strong) that reflect the strength of the relationship between the direct 
effect and the decision element.  Latent effects represent the influence that one decision element 
imposes on another.  Their attribute values are simply represented by the output value of the 
“latent” decision element. 
 
Along with an attribute value, each input is assigned a weighting factor.  These weighting factors 
reflect the ability of an input, whether a direct or latent effect, to influence the decision element 
relative to all other attributes contributing to that element.  As such, the aggregated sum of the 
weighting factors contributing to an individual decision element must equal one.  
 
2.4. Data Aggregation 
 
Data aggregation allows attributes to be combined to derive various sorts of information, such as 
combined ratings of subsystems or the entire system, and trends information.  The strategy 
extends naturally to decision analysis, where decision aids must be developed for assessing 
system integrity, determining the need for operational restrictions, and selecting among 
alternative approaches or forensic hypotheses.  Since measurements can lead to assessments 
when compared to norms or acceptance margins, subsequent analytical methodology and 
information presentation can contribute to a structured approach for defensible decision-making.   
 
According to the discussion above, care must be given to the selection of the prescribed data 
aggregation scheme; that is, the manner by which the observed metrics (i.e., attribute values) are 
combined to yield quantitative information toward the decision of interest, in this case, the 
information defining the credibility of a particular threat.  For each decision element, input 
values are aggregated to provide an assessment score, and this process continues for each 
decision element until an overall threat assessment score is derived.  There are varieties of 
weighted sums that can be employed, each having a different influence on the outcome.  The 
choice of the weighed sum depends on one’s confidence in the data and the nature of the 
decision process.  One form that has been used is termed “soft aggregation.”  An example of a 
soft aggregation weighted sum is:  
 (2) 
 
 
 
 
where WSj is the weighted sum for the jth decision element, x is the attribute value for direct 
inputs or latent effects, w is the weighting factor for direct input or latent effect, 
(where  ∑
=
=
n
i
iw
1
1) 
n is the number of direct inputs and latent effects contributing to the decision element. The “a” is 
the slope parameter the shift parameter is “b”.   
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Figure 2 depicts the soft aggregation scheme of Equation 2, using weights (wi) equal to 0.5 and 
attribute values of zero and one, x1=0 and x2=1. The shift parameter (b) in this graph is 0.5 and 
the slope parameters (a) range from 5.5 to 30.  These values are specific to those used in the 
model and will be explained in further detail in the following sections.   
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Figure 2.  Soft Aggregation Scheme 
 
 
An alternative to soft aggregation is the simple linear weighted sum where the variables are the 
same as above.   
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The Figure 3 depicts the difference between these types of aggregation schemes. 
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Figure 3.  Soft Aggregation vs. Linear Aggregation 
 
 
2.5. Model Implementation 
 
With the MLE model, assessments are performed for specific threats by inputting attribute values 
that are specific to the threat.  As attribute values are assigned, primarily through expert 
elicitation, care must be taken to reduce subjective variation in the attribute value to a minimum.  
That is, the process must be repeatable; it must be assured that similarly qualified people seeing 
the same situation would record similar, but not necessarily exactly the same, results.  
Repeatability is accomplished by specifically defining the numerical representation of the 
qualitative information during the elicitation process.  This is accomplished by using elicitation 
guides (e.g., Figure 4) during the elicitation process.    
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Figure 4.  Sample Elicitation Guide 
 
Issues of uncertainty can be addressed within the MLE modeling framework.  Uncertainty 
inherent to the Markov inputs arises from two sources.  One is that a person entering an input 
may be unsure of the value.  Another is that a collection of people collaborating on the input may 
not agree on exactly the same value regardless of the amount of guidance provided.  To capture 
this uncertainty, an attribute value can be represented by a range of numbers rather than a single 
deterministic value.  This suggests that the resulting output will be in the form of a range of 
numbers rather than a single value.  However, using Microsoft Excel as the interface for the 
current MLE model, ranges of values cannot be entered within one scenario.  Therefore, ranges 
of values can be entered by running scenarios multiple times. 
 
Other important features of MLE modeling are the Importance and Sensitivity metrics.  The 
Importance metric allows a user to identify those features that most significantly contribute to the 
success of a threat.  The Importance metric is simply calculated by deriving the difference 
between the output value with the input as entered and the output value when one of the input 
values has been set to zero.  By repeating this process the input with the greatest influence on the 
output can be found.  Similarly, the Sensitivity is calculated as the difference between the output 
Direct Input Variable: On Site Security 
Elicitation Question: What is the level of physical security monitoring at a site? 
 
Enter any number or range of numbers between 0 and 1 to indicate a qualitative 
judgment (or range of possible judgments) of the strength of the relationship. 0 
represents extremely weak, and 1 represents extremely strong 
 
Attribute 
  Value 
0.0 to 0.3 No direct monitoring of the site.  Site is remote and is not visited by 
security personnel. 
 
0.3 to 0.5 Limited monitoring occurs at the site.  Security personnel visit  
 site at random intervals. 
 
0.5 to 0.7 There is limited direct monitoring of site.  Security checks site  
 regularly during off-hours. 
 
0.7 to 0.9 Security personnel on site 24 hours a day but is only stationed at  
 the entrance of facility, not at site. 
 
0.9 to 1.0 Direct monitoring of the site occurs around the clock by security  
 personnel.  Security personnel are on site 24-hours and are constantly 
 patrolling facility. 
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value with the input as entered and the output value when one of the input values has been set to 
one.  The Sensitivity metric measures the potential for improvement in that input to result in a 
measurable improvement in the total result.   
 
To summarize, an MLE threat assessment model consists of a network of decision elements and 
inputs as defined through the decomposition process.  The model is populated with a set of fixed 
weighting factors and a prescribed data aggregation scheme.  Assigning corresponding attribute 
values for direct effects (with help from the elicitation guides, e.g., Figure 4) and aggregating the 
values over all the decision elements provides an overall threat assessment score.  The resulting 
assessment score provides a measure of the credibility of that specific threat scenario.  By 
consistently following the same analysis scheme, assessment scores calculated for different 
threat scenarios can be compared and ranked to identify the most credible threat.  The threat 
assessment scores range between 0 and 1.  A threat assessment score of 1, for example, would 
mean that the system has the highest likelihood of being attacked and the system effectiveness 
against the attack is nonexistent.  Conversely, a threat assessment value of 0 means that the 
system can defeat the threat and the possibility of successful attack is zero.    
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3.  MLE WATER MODEL 
 
3.1. Purpose 
 
To define the MLE model in more specific terms, specific application to threat assessment of 
water distribution systems is made.  The purpose of this model is to calculate in a quantitative, 
repeatable, and defensible process, threat assessment values for a water utility system based on 
different scenarios.  Each scenario consists of three parts, the assailant, the weapon, and the 
asset.  For example, an insider (the assailant) who wants to contaminate (weapon) a water 
storage tank (asset).   
 
The MLE water model is based on literature reviews of other vulnerability assessment-type 
models, such as RAM-W, Yacoiv and Haimes models and the Cooper MLE aviation model.  It 
was also developed with the help of individuals from the EPA, and multiple organizations within 
Sandia National Laboratories.  A literature review was not only conducted on vulnerability 
assessment models, but also on legislation before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the US.  Furthermore, literature on human behavior threat assessment models 
developed by the Department of Justice and United States Secret Service for assassins, weapons, 
and other targeted violence was researched.  After reviewing the literature, a broader 
understanding of assailants, water systems, and weapons was obtained.  This aided in 
determining the decision elements needed in the model and their significance in where to place 
them within the model framework.   
 
3.2. Overview 
 
The MLE threat assessment model for water distribution systems is formulated within a fully 
generic context; that is, it has direct application to almost any water utility.  The model is 
adapted to a particular utility by the utility specific attribute values input into the model by water 
utility personnel.  The MLE model structure is presented in Figure 5 and a description of each 
direct input variable is given in Table 1.  Additional discussion regarding each of the elements 
and their location in the model is discussed in the following sections. 
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Figure 5. MLE Model
Grey boxes represent Direct Effects/Direct Inputs and white boxes represent Decision Elements.  Weighting factors for each are shown by corresponding color.
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Table 1.  Description of the direct inputs to the MLE model  
 
 
ASSAILANT PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCE 
Decision Element Direct Input Description 
Attention Goals Desired Attention The attention that the assailant wants to 
receive because of the attack.  
Media Attention Asset Importance How important an asset is to a water 
utility, community, and/or nation. 
Health Impact Deaths The number of human deaths that occur 
because of the attack. 
Health Impact Illnesses The number of human illnesses that 
occur because of the attack. 
Health Goals Desired Health 
Impact 
The health impact that the assailant 
wants to have on society because of the 
attack. 
Economic Losses Repair Costs The cost to repair damage caused by 
the attack. 
Economic Losses Protection Costs Protection cost to improve personal and 
property safety.   
Economic Losses Economic Disruption The economic loss caused by the attack 
(e.g., lost wages, lost services). 
Economic Goals Desired Economic 
Impact 
The economic loss that the assailant 
wants to impose on the economy. 
Social Disruption Duration of Impact A measure of the time that the exposed 
population is inconvenienced by the 
attack. 
Social Disruption Number of People 
Impacted 
The number of people impacted (by 
loss of water) by an attack. 
Disruption Goals  Desired Level of 
Disruption 
The level of disruption that the 
assailant wants to impose on society.  
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Table 1. continued:  Description of the direct inputs to the MLE model  
ASSAILANT EFFORTS 
Decision Element Direct Input Description 
Asset Locality Acclimation Needed The overall familiarity the assailant has 
with the location and attributes of the 
attack site. 
Asset Locality Travel Restrictions The restrictions that an assailant will 
have to overcome to get to an assets 
location 
Asset Locality Language Barrier How much of the language an assailant 
would have to know to carry out an 
attack. 
Asset Locality Time of Travel The amount of time (including 
relocation) that it will take an assailant 
to travel to an asset. 
Chance of Assailant Being 
Caught 
Strength of Police 
Force 
A measure of how strong the local 
police force is in the jurisdiction of the 
asset. 
Chance of Assailant Being 
Caught 
Federal Level of 
Involvement 
A measure of how involved the federal 
government in dealing with attacks. 
Chance of Assailant Being 
Caught 
Profiled Group A measure of whether or not the 
assailant is part of a group that is 
profiled to carry out attacks and the 
level of scrutiny they are under by the 
government. 
Chance of Assailant Being 
Caught 
Political Will The will that the country has to protect 
themselves from an attack. 
 
ASSAILANT CAPABILITY 
Decision Element Direct Input Description 
Qualifications Assailant Training Measures the knowledge base of the 
assailant. Considers both the assailant's 
professional training and specialized 
training for the mission at hand. This 
measure must be considered in light of 
the complexity of the mission. 
Qualifications Special Expertise  A measure of the how much special 
expertise/training an assailant needs to 
have with respect to carrying out the 
mission. 
Funding Cost of Attack The amount of money that the assailant 
would have to have access to in order 
to carry out an attack. 
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Table 1. continued:  Description of the direct inputs to the MLE model  
ASSAILANT CAPABILITY 
Decision Element Direct Input Description 
Funding Available Funds A measure of the access the assailant 
has to the monetary resources 
necessary to accomplish the mission. 
Motivation Peer Pressure The influence external social and 
cultural factors have on an assailant’s 
action. 
Motivation Hatred The emotional motivation influencing 
an assailant's actions. 
Motivation Cause The ideological motivation influencing 
an assailant's actions. 
Motivation Outlook The assailant's outlook on the future 
and how it influences his actions. 
Access System Knowledge The access the assailant has to 
information pertinent to the mission. 
Access System Accessibility The access that an assailant has to an 
asset. 
Access Recognition The ability to be recognized within a 
facility.  This is considered as the 
likelihood to blend in while carrying 
out an attack.   
Preparation Degree of Planning The amount of preparation that goes 
into a mission and how well things are 
thought out prior to a mission. 
Preparation Network The access an assailant has to qualified 
personnel for designing and planning 
the mission. This measure must be 
considered in light of the complexity of 
the mission. 
Preparation Required Planning The amount of planning required by the 
assailant to carry out the attack. 
Technology Capability Available Technology The amount of technology available to 
the assailant to carry out an attack. 
Technology Capability Technology Needed The technology needed to carry out an 
attack. 
Agent Dissemination Difficulty of 
Dissemination  
The difficulty with which an agent is 
dispersed in an effective manner (e.g., 
solubility of a chemical agent). 
Agent Dissemination Ability to 
Disseminate Agent 
The ease with which the assailant can 
disperse the agent in an effective 
manner (e.g., solubility of a chemical 
agent). 
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Table 1. continued:  Description of the direct inputs to the MLE model  
ASSAILANT CAPABILITY 
Decision Element Direct Input Description 
Agent Accessibility  Limitation to Agent 
Availability  
The difficulty in obtaining or 
producing an agent. 
Agent Accessibility Agent Accessibility The ability of the assailant to obtain or 
produce an Agent. 
 
ASSET SECURITY 
Decision Element Direct Input Description 
Team Qualifications Assailant Training The knowledge base of the assailant. 
Considers both the assailant's 
professional training and specialized 
training for the mission at hand.  This 
measure must be considered in light of 
the complexity of the mission. 
Team Qualifications Responders Training How much training and capability the 
response force has prior to responding 
to an attack.   
Response Force Number of Assailants The number of assailants that carry out 
an attack. 
Response Force Number of 
Responders 
The number of response personnel that 
respond to an event. 
Response Weapons Assailant Weapons Weapons the assailants have to protect 
themselves 
Response Weapons Responders Weapons Weapons the responders have to 
mitigate an attack. 
Likelihood of Response Response Procedures A formalized set of processes that are 
implemented in a response event. 
Likelihood of Response Dedicated Response 
Personnel  
The personnel dedicated to respond to 
an event. 
Critical Attack Time Time to Implement 
Attack 
The time it takes an assailant to 
implement an attack to a water system.  
Critical Attack Time Time for Attack to 
Impact 
The time it takes for an attack to the 
water system to be realized. 
Time to Respond Response Time Time for respondent to arrive at site of 
alarm 
Time to Respond Detection Time Time to detect breach or attack  
Time to Respond Decision Time Time required to decide to respond to 
alarm 
Physical Security Asset Barriers The amount of physical barriers to an 
asset. Not including alarm systems. 
Physical Security Distance to Asset The distance between the asset and a 
reference access way. 
Physical Security Access Limitations The accessibility of the asset to the 
assailant. 
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Table 1. continued:  Description of the direct inputs to the MLE model  
ASSET SECURITY 
Decision Element Direct Input Description 
Physical Security Difficulty to Deliver 
Agent 
The ability to deliver an Agent to the 
point of attack. 
Alarms/Video Surveillance Percentage of time that the alarm is 
monitored 
Alarms/Video/Sensors 
Reliability 
Quality The accuracy and monitoring quality of 
the system. 
Alarms/Video/Sensors 
Reliability 
Maintenance Frequency of maintenance performed 
on the security system 
Alarms/Sensors Reliability Sensitivity Ability of sensor to accurately 
distinguish abnormal event 
System Monitoring Sensor Location Sufficiency and optimality of 
distribution of sensors 
Physical Monitoring On-Site Security Number of man-hours site monitored 
by security officers 
Physical Monitoring On-Site Personnel Number of utility personnel and time 
they spend at the site 
Public Surveillance Likelihood of 
Reporting 
Historical frequency of public reporting 
abnormal events 
Public Surveillance Visibility Percent of unobstructed and lighted 
view of facility 
Public Surveillance Location Number of people passing by site on 
daily basis 
Employee/Management Culture Measure of general concern for security 
issues 
Employee/Management Training Type and frequency of training on 
security matters 
Management Security 
Administration 
Management structure responsible for 
security oversight 
Security Environment Intelligence Reliability of prior information 
concerning likelihood of an attack 
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3.3. MLE Water Model Structure 
 
The MLE model is a top down approach based on the threat assessment equation, Pa(1-Pe), (from 
Equation 1) at the highest level.  Accordingly, at the top level, the model is divided into two 
decision elements; the Possibility of Attack (Pa) and the System Effectiveness (Pe).  The overall 
model is shown in Figure 5.   
 
The Possibility of Attack (as opposed to the probability of attack due to lack of probabilistic 
data) side of the model is a measure of the overall possibility that a specific attack will take 
place.  This side of the model is formulated as a balance between Assailant Perceived 
Consequence of the attack and the Assailant Efforts that go into planning and implementing the 
attack.  The Assailant Efforts and the Assailant Perceived Consequence are balanced against 
each other to determine a value for Pa.  The balance between Assailant Perceived Consequence 
and Assailant Efforts recognizes that the level of effort required by the attack must be compatible 
with the perceived payoff.  For example, an assailant will have to put a significant amount of 
effort into attacking a water tank with a biological agent, these efforts may be deemed as 
acceptable to the assailant if there is a high-perceived consequence.   
 
The System Effectiveness (Pe) side of the model is also structured around a balance.  However, 
this balance is between the Assailant’s Capability and the overall security of an asset, Asset 
Security.  These two elements are balanced against each other to determine a value for Pe.  That 
is, the capability of an assailant offsets the level of asset security.  For example, an incapable 
assailant would not be able to overcome a highly secured asset.   
 
From these two secondary levels of the model, Possibility of Attack and System Effectiveness, 
the rest of the model is developed as described in the following sections.  
 
3.3.1. Possibility of Attack 
 
As described above the Possibility of Attack is a balance between Assailant Perceived 
Consequence and Assailant Efforts.  These are described in detail in the following sections.  The 
aggregation for Possibility of Attack uses a soft aggregation scheme (Equation 2) of the decision 
elements Assailant Perceived Consequence and Assailant Efforts.  Soft aggregation is used to 
yield a relatively slow response in the tails of the distribution and rapid changes in the central 
regions.  Specifically, the case where the assailant is faced with a selectively high level of effort 
that results in limited consequence then the aggregate score will remain small.  High aggregate 
scores occur when assailant efforts are relatively low and attack consequences are high.  As a 
result, resolution in the aggregate scores is needed when the efforts and the consequences are 
more equally balanced, which should yield intermediate scores.   
 
In addition to using a soft aggregation scheme to balance Assailant Perceived Consequence and 
Assailant Efforts, an “IF” statement is used to calculate Pa.  
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WSj=0.01 IF Agent Accessibility ≤ 0.01 otherwise 
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The slope parameter (a) in this calculation is 5.5 and the shift parameter (b) is 0.5 in order to 
achieve the aforementioned reasons.  The reason that an IF statement is used for the Possibility 
of Attack, is so that the assailant’s access to a weapon is a significant driver of whether or not an 
attack can occur.  For example, a vandal does not typically have access to a biological or 
chemical Agent; therefore without access to a weapon the overall possibility of that particular 
attack occurring is little to none.   
 
3.3.1.1. Assailant Perceived Consequence 
 
The Assailant Perceived Consequence portion of the model is the measure of the payoff or return 
that the assailant perceives will occur because of the attack.  Five main consequences are 
identified based on the work of Fein and Vossekuil (1998) and the RAM-WTM model (AwwaRF, 
2002).  The first four decision elements are:  Attention Goals, Health Goals, Economic Goals, 
and Disruption Goals.  These latent decision elements are weighted 0.3, 0.2, 0.2, and 0.3, 
respectively.  Attention Goals and Disruption Goals are weighted slightly higher since an 
assailant may be somewhat more concerned about the disruption that an attack causes and 
attention that it receives rather than the heath or economic impacts.  The fifth decision element, 
Media Attention, is not a direct input into Assailant Perceived Consequence but is a latent effect 
to Attention Goals since the amount of media attention an attack receives can correlate with the 
overall attention goals.  The aggregate Assailant Perceived Consequence score is calculated as a 
linear weighted sum of each of the four latent decision elements (Equation 3).   
 
The decision element Attention Goals is a measure of the Media Attention that occurs because of 
the attack balanced against the attention that the assailant desires.  The direct inputs that feed into 
Attention Goals are Desired Attention and Media Attention.  Media Attention a latent effect of 
Asset Importance, Health Impact, Economic Losses, and Social Disruption, with weights of 0.2, 
0.3, 0.3, and 0.2.  The aggregation for Media Attention is a linear weighted sum (Equation 3) of 
the direct inputs.  The decision element Attention Goals is a balance of the actual Media 
Attention versus the Desired Attention of the assailant.  Therefore, this decision element employs 
a form of the soft aggregation scheme (Equation 2) of the decision element Media Attention and 
the direct input Desired Attention.  The aggregation scheme used is: 
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where x is the Actual Attention received (Media Attention) and y is the Desired Attention.  The 
slope parameter (a) equals 15.5 and the shift parameter (b) is set to 0.8.  This aggregation scheme 
and parameters are used with the intention that if the assailants’ desires are met (actual Media 
Attention greater than Desired Attention) the goal is successful therefore returning a score of 1 
when the Media Attention score is close to or larger than the Desired Attention and zero 
otherwise.  
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The decision element Health Goals is a measure of the Health Impact that balanced against the 
Desired Health Impact that the assailant would like to occur.  The direct inputs that feed into 
Health Goals are Desired Health Impact and Health Impact.  The decision element Health Impact 
is made up of two direct inputs, Deaths and Illnesses with weights of 0.6 and 0.4.  Number of 
deaths is weighted more heavily since a death is more significant than an illness.  The 
aggregation for Health Impact is a linear weighted sum (Equation 3) of the direct inputs Deaths 
and Illnesses.  The aggregation for the decision element Health Goals uses Equation 6. 
 
 WSj=1.0 IF y=0 and x<0.05 otherwise; 
 WSj=0.0 IF x/y>1.2 otherwise; (6) 
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Variables include x as the latent effect Health Impact and y as the Desired Health Impact.  In the 
soft aggregation equation used for this decision element, the slope parameter (a) is 30 and shift 
parameter (b) is 0.8, all other variables are as previously defined.  The reason this equation 
includes multiple IF statements is so that if the actual impacts of an attack are greater than the 
desired impacts the assailant is penalized.  For example consider a case where an Insider only 
wants to bring to light vulnerabilities in the utility by dumping household chemicals into a 
storage tank, however, many people become ill.  This was not his intention; therefore, the Health 
Goals decision element is set to zero.   
 
The decision element Economic Goals is a measure of the Economic Losses that occur because 
of the attack balanced against the Desired Economic Impact that the assailant would like to 
occur.  Economic Losses can be considered a motivator of an assailant based on the 
consequences that the September 11, 2001 event had on the airline industry.  The direct inputs 
that feed into Economic Goals are Desired Economic Impact and Economic Losses.  The 
decision element Economic Losses is made up of three direct inputs, Repair Costs, Protection 
Costs and Economic Disruption with weights of 0.3, 0.1, and 0.3.  The decision element Health 
Impact is also a latent effect of Economic Losses with a weight of 0.3.  Health impact is a latent 
effect of Economic Losses because a health outbreak includes economic losses.  The aggregation 
for Economic Losses is a linear weighted sum (Equation 3) of the direct inputs Repair Costs, 
Protection Costs and Economic Disruption and the latent effect Health Impact.  The aggregation 
for Economic Goals employs Equation 6 where x is the latent effect Economic Losses and y is 
the direct input Desired Economic Impact for the same reasons as mentioned previously.  
 
The decision element Disruption Goals is a measure of the Social Disruption that occurs because 
of the attack balanced against the Desired Level of Disruption that the assailant would like to 
occur.  The direct inputs that feed into Disruption Goals are Desired Level of Disruption and 
Social Disruption.  The decision element Social Disruption is made up of two direct inputs, 
Duration of Impact and Number of People Impacted each weighted at 0.5.  Social Disruption is 
also a latent effect to Media Attention because the degree of disruption promotes attention.  The 
aggregation for Social Disruption is a linear weighted sum (Equation 3) of the direct inputs 
Duration of Impact and Number of People Impacted.  The aggregation for Disruption Goals 
employs Equation 6 where x is the latent effect Social Disruption and y is the direct input 
Desired Level of Disruption for the same reasons as mentioned previously. 
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3.3.1.2. Assailant Efforts 
 
The Assailant Efforts portion of the model measures the effort an assailant will have to devote to 
the attack.  Assailant Efforts is comprised of decision elements based on the work of Fein et. al. 
(1999) and the RAM-WTM model (AwwaRF, 2002).  Three decision elements are structured as 
direct latent effects of Assailant Efforts.  These decision elements are:  Asset Locality, Chance of 
Assailant Being Caught, and Assailant Capability.  The latent decision elements are weighted 
0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 respectively.  Assailant Capability is weighted as half of Assailant Efforts since 
the capability of an assailant greatly influences the amount of effort an assailant must put forth in 
order to carry out an attack.  For example, an insider has high capabilities with respect to access 
to the utility, therefore reducing his overall efforts.  The aggregate Assailant Efforts score is 
calculated as a linear weighted sum (Equation 3) and subtracted from 1.  The weighted sum is 
subtracted from one to reverse the sense of the score to make it compatible with Assailant 
Perceived Consequence, with which it is aggregated to determine the Possibility of Attack.  That 
is, the Possibility of Attack will increase as Assailant Perceived Consequences increase and/or 
Assailant Efforts decrease.  For purposes of consistency in inputting values all direct inputs are 
defined in such a way that their scores increase.  
 
The decision element Asset Locality is a measure of the overall ease that the assailant has in 
accessing the asset and the familiarity that the assailant has with the location of the asset.  The 
direct inputs that feed Asset Locality are Acclimation Needed, Travel Restrictions, Language 
Barrier, and Time of Travel, with weights of 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.2.  These inputs attempt to 
describe how an assailant might select a target (Borum et. al, 1999).  The aggregation for Asset 
Locality is a linear weighted sum of the inputs (Equation 3).   
 
The next decision element, Chance of Assailant Being Caught, is a measure of how likely an 
assailant can plan and complete an attack without being caught.  The direct inputs that feed into 
Chance of Assailant Being Caught are Strength of Police Force, Federal Level of Involvement, 
Profiled Group and Political Will, with weights of 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.2.  The equation used to 
determine the value for Chance of Assailant Being Caught is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum 
of the inputs. 
 
Finally, the last latent effect to Assailant Efforts is Assailant Capability.  This decision element 
recognizes all of the assailant’s capabilities, with respect to the attack, as described within the 
System Effectiveness portion of the model.   
 
3.3.2. System Effectiveness 
 
As explained previously, the System Effectiveness is a balance between the Assailant’s 
Capability and Asset Security.  The aggregation for System Effectiveness uses a soft aggregation 
scheme (Equation 2) of the decision elements Assailant Capability and Asset Security.  This 
aggregation assumes that the latent effects are equally weighted at 0.5, the slope parameter (a) 
equals 7.5 and the shift parameter is set to 0.5.  This equation balances Assailant Capability 
against Asset Security.  Where Asset Security is high and Assailant Capability is low the System 
Effectiveness is high, while if Asset Security is low and Assailant Capability is high System 
Effectiveness is low.  Alternatively when Assailant Capability and Asset Security are relatively 
equally matched, the weighted soft aggregation scores change quickly. 
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3.3.2.1. Assailant Capability 
 
The Assailant Capability portion of the model is made up of decision elements that relate to the 
overall capabilities of the assailant such as the assailants qualifications, motivations, amount of 
funding available, technical abilities, personnel and weapons available, and ability to access the 
asset.  Eight main efforts have been identified based on the work of Fein et. al. (1998, 1999, 
2000, 2002), Borum et. al. (1999), Pynchon (1999), Vossekuil (2001) and the RAM-WTM model 
(AwwaRF, 2002).  These efforts are defined by decision elements and all are latent effects of 
Assailant Capability.  The decision elements are: Qualifications, Funding, Motivation, Access, 
Preparation, Technology Capability, Weapon Dissemination, and Weapon Accessibility.  These 
latent decision elements are weighted 0.1, 0.1, 0.25, 0.25, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05, and 0.05, respectively.  
As noted by the weighting factors, Motivation and Access are more heavily weighted than the 
other decision elements indicating that these two elements make up half of the weighting for 
Assailant Capability.  Thus, if an assailant has access to an asset the capability of that assailant 
increases significantly.  Moreover, if the assailant is motivated they will have more desire to 
carryout the attack, therefore increasing their overall capability based on their willingness to 
accomplish the task at any cost.  Assailant Capability is aggregated using Equation 3 and 
subtracted from one. 
 
The first latent effect of Assailant Capability is Qualifications.  This is a measure of whether or 
not the assailant has the qualifications needed to carry out an attack.  The direct inputs that feed 
into Qualifications are Assailant Training and Special Expertise.  These inputs are a balance of 
one another as Assailant Training is the training that the assailant has and Special Expertise is the 
training that the assailant needs in order to carry out the attack.  The equation used to aggregate 
this decision element is Equation 5 using a slope parameter of 30 and shift parameter is 0.8.  This 
methodology is used so that the function behaves like a step function with the intention that the 
assailant’s abilities are balanced against the required abilities e.g. an assailant either has the 
ability to carry out an attack (in which case the score is 1) or he doesn’t (score of 0).   
 
The decision element Funding is a measure of the whether or not the assailant has the funds 
needed to carry out the attack.  The direct inputs that feed into Funding are a balance of one 
another and are Cost of Attack and Available Funds.  The aggregation for this decision element 
also uses Equation 5 to balance whether or not the assailant has the required funds.   
 
The next decision element in Assailant Capability is Motivation.  Motivation is a measure of the 
drive the assailant has to carry out the attack.  The direct inputs that feed into Motivation are 
Peer Pressure, Hatred, Cause and Outlook, each with a weighting of 0.25.  These four attributes 
are common motivators of both assassins and insiders according to Fein and Vossekuil (1999) 
and the Insider Threat Study for the Banking and Finance Sector studies (Randazzo, et. al, 2004).  
The assailant’s current lifestyle can have a significant influence on their ability and likelihood of 
attack.  Moreover, a group’s influence over an individual can strongly impact their behavior and 
actions (Pynchon and Borum, 1999).  The aggregation scheme for this decision element is 
Equation 3, a linear weighted sum of the inputs.  
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The next decision element that feeds into Assailant Capability is Access.  Access is a measure of 
how accessible the system is to the assailant.  This decision element has three direct inputs, 
System Knowledge, System Accessibility and Recognition with weights of 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3.  
These three elements are attributes of assailants as indicated in RAM-WTM  (AwwaRF, 2002) 
and the Insider Threat Study for the Banking and Finance Sector (Randazzo et. al., 2004).  The 
aggregation for this decision element is linear weighted sum of the inputs.  
 
The next decision element that feeds into Assailant Capability is Preparation.  This decision 
element is a balance between the amount of planning that goes into an attack versus the required 
planning to carry out that attack.  The direct inputs into Preparation are: Degree of Planning, 
Network, and Required Planning.  The input value Required Planning is a common component 
of attacks, noted by the Banking and Finance Sector Insider Threat Study, where the findings 
indicated that most incidents required little planning or networking, most of the attacks took 
place from the individuals’ workstation during regular business hours (Randazzo et. al. 2004).  
The aggregation for this decision element balances Degree of Planning and Network versus 
Required Planning with weights for Degree of Planning and Network being 0.4 and 0.6 balanced 
against Required Planning using a form of Equation 5: 
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where xi is the amount of planning that goes into an attack, wi is the corresponding weight, n is 
the number of attribute values contributing to the decision element Preparation and y is Required 
Planning for the attack.  The slope parameter used in this case is 30 and the shift parameter is 
0.8.  These parameters are used so that when an assailant has a plan that meets or exceeds what is 
required, the decision element score yields a one, otherwise the score is zero.   
 
The next decision element that feeds into Assailant Capability is Technology Capability.  
Technology Capability is a measure of how much technology is needed for an attack versus the 
amount of technology available for the attack.  The direct inputs that feed into Technology 
Capability are Available Technology and Technology Needed and the latent effect Preparation.  
This decision element is a balance between Available Technology and Preparation versus the 
Technology Needed.  The aggregation for this decision element balances Available Technology 
and Preparation versus the Technology Needed (Equation 7).  The slope parameter used in this 
case is 30 and the shift parameter is 0.8 for the same reasons as mentioned previously.   
 
The next decision element that feeds into Assailant Capability is Means Dissemination.  Means 
Dissemination is a measure of how difficult it is for an assailant to deliver an agent or attack 
means versus his ability to disseminate it.  The direct inputs into Means Dissemination are 
Difficulty of Dissemination versus Ability to Disseminate Means and are based on the Sandia 
Report 2003-0031 (Teter et. al. 2003).  This decision element is a balance between these two 
inputs.  The aggregation for this decision element uses a soft aggregation scheme (Equation 5) 
where the slope parameter used is 30 and the shift parameter is 0.8 for the same reasons as 
mentioned previously.   
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The final decision element that feeds into Assailant Capability is Weapon Means Accessibility.  
Means Accessibility is a measure of how easily the assailant can access the weapon in sufficient 
quantity to accomplish the attack.  The direct inputs into Weapon Accessibility are Limitation to 
Weapon Availability and Weapon Accessibility.  This decision element is a balance between 
these two inputs.  The aggregation for this decision element uses Equation 5, with a slope 
parameter of 30 and the shift parameter of 0.8.  
 
3.3.2.2. Asset Security 
 
The decision elements that make up the Asset Security side of the model take into account the 
response capability of the water utility and community, the delay functions of the asset, the 
detection abilities of the asset and the culture of the water utility.  All of the decision elements 
are aggregated to obtain an overall value for System Effectiveness, Pe. 
 
The Asset Security portion of the model is composed of the three basic decision elements that 
make up a Physical Protection System (PPS): Detection, Delay, and Response, in addition to the 
culture of the water utility.  A Physical Protection System is the overall security system of an 
asset.  These three elements are the basis of many critical asset assessments and underpin the 
RAM-WTM process.  Detection is intrusion sensing, alarm communication, and alarm 
assessment.  Delay is made up of the barriers protecting an asset and Response is the 
communication to the response force, and the deployment of the response force with the ultimate 
goal being to stop/prevent an attack.  (Garcia, M.L., 2001)  The elements Delay and Response 
are direct latent effects of the output decision element, Asset Security and are equally weighted 
as 0.5.  However, Detection is not a direct latent effect of Asset Security, but feeds into the 
decision elements contributing to Response with a weight of 0.5.  This choice of structure is 
deliberate in that detection has no value unless there is an associated response. 
 
Furthermore, the decision element Security Environment, which represents the security culture 
of the utility, is a latent effect to the Detect, Delay, and Response decision elements since the 
culture of the water utility can have an effect on all aspects of security.  The aggregation for 
Asset Security uses Equation 2 and assumes that the direct latent effects feeding into the decision 
element are equally weighted at 0.5, the slope parameter (a) equals 5.5 and the shift parameter is 
set to 0.5.  This equal weighting is intentional since the amount of time it takes to respond to an 
event, in order to try to mitigate it, should be faster than the time it takes an assailant to 
overcome the delay features of an asset.   
 
3.3.2.2.1. Security Environment 
 
The Security Environment decision element is a measure of the concern and awareness that 
utility employees have toward system security.  The decision elements that make up Security 
Environment are Employees and Management.  These are weighted 0.4 and 0.4, respectively.  
The decision element Employees is further broken down into Employee Culture and Employee 
Training each with weights of 0.5.  The decision element Management is also broken down into 
these two categories in addition to the direct input Security Administration.  These are weighted 
0.5, 0.3, and 0.2.  These inputs are based on Cooper’s development of the MLE model (2001).  
An additional direct input to Security Environment is Intelligence which is weighted as 0.2.  The 
aggregation for the decision element Security Environment is a linear weighted sum of the three 
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decision elements Employees, Intelligence, and Management using Equation 3.  Furthermore, the 
attitude of the personnel influences the likelihood and speed at which they will detect and 
respond to abnormal operations which is why Security Environment is a latent effect of the 
Detection, Delay and Response elements. 
 
3.3.2.2.2. Detection 
 
The first required function of a security system is the detection of an assailant’s actions.  The 
Detection decision element relates to the different methods of detecting breaches and/or 
contamination of a water distribution system.  Five decision elements form latent effects to the 
Detection element.  The decision elements are:  Remote Monitoring, System Monitoring, 
Physical Monitoring, Public Surveillance and the Security Environment.  These latent effects are 
weighted 0.2, 0.1, 0.4, 0.1, and 0.2.  These weights represent how likely utility personnel are to 
respond to the alarm based on the type of monitoring.  All of these are part of the intrusion 
sensing, alarm communication, and alarm assessment categories in RAM-WTM (AwwaRF, 2002).  
The aggregation for the decision element Detection is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum of the 
decision elements.  
 
The first direct input into Detection is Remote Monitoring.  This element is made up of inputs 
that measure confidence in the detection system including Alarms and Video Surveillance with 
weights of 0.4 and 0.6.  The aggregation for the decision element Remote Monitoring is Equation 
3, a linear weighted sum of the decision elements. The Alarm decision element is further 
resolved into the direct input Alarm Surveillance of the detector, and the latent effect Alarm 
Reliability.  Alarm Surveillance has a weighting factor of 0.4 and Alarm Reliability has a factor 
of 0.6.  This weighting represents that reliably of the system is more important than the 
surveillance, since if the system is reliable, it is more likely that it will be monitored by utility 
personnel.  The Alarm decision element is aggregated by Equation 3, a linear weighted sum.   
 
The Alarm Reliability decision element is further broken into direct inputs of Quality, 
Maintenance, and Sensitivity with weights of 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3.  The equation used to determine 
the value for Alarm Reliability is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum of the inputs.   
 
The Video decision element is broken down into the direct input Video Surveillance, and the 
latent effect Video Reliability with weights of 0.4 and 0.6.  This weighting considers the reliably 
of the video system more important than the surveillance.   The Video Reliability decision 
element is further broken into direct inputs of Quality and Maintenance.  Both Video 
Maintenance and Video Quality have weighting factors of 0.5 into Video Reliability.  The 
equation used to determine the value for Video Reliability is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum 
of the inputs.  The Alarms and Video decision elements are aggregated into the overall decision 
element Remote Monitoring by a linear weighted sum.   
 
The second decision element that is a latent effect of Detection is System Monitoring.  This 
decision element addresses the ability of inline sensors (e.g., pressure, flow, chlorine) to detect 
changes resulting from an attack. The elements that make up this decision element are Sensor 
Reliability and Sensor Location.  These are weighted 0.6 and 0.4 using the same reasoning as 
before in that reliability is more important than surveillance.  The equation used to determine the 
value for System Monitoring is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum of the inputs.   
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The Sensor Reliability decision element is further broken down by direct inputs of Sensor 
Quality, Sensor Maintenance and Sensor Sensitivity with weights of 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3. The 
equation used to determine the value for Sensor Reliability is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum 
of the inputs.   
 
The third decision element that makes up Detection is Physical Monitoring.  Physical Monitoring 
is a measure of the physical monitoring that occurs on site at a water utility that could aid in 
detecting an issue.  Physical Monitoring has two direct inputs, Onsite Security and Onsite 
Personnel with weights of 0.6 and 0.4.  The equation used to determine the value for Physical 
Monitoring is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum of the Onsite Security and Onsite Personnel 
inputs. 
 
The next decision element to make up Detection is Public Surveillance.  Public Surveillance is a 
measure of how likely it is that a citizen would report a suspicious activity to officials.  Public 
Surveillance is made up of three direct inputs, Likelihood of Reporting, Location, and Visibility 
with weights of 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3.  The equation used to determine the value for Public 
Surveillance is Equation 3, a linear weighted sum of the direct inputs. 
 
In addition to the four decision elements that make up Detection, the decision element Security 
Environment is also a latent effect to Detection.  Security Environment has a weighting factor of 
0.2 into the Detection decision element.  The reason that Security Environment is a latent effect 
to Detection is because if a water utility has an environment that does not take monitoring their 
system seriously, detection of events is unlikely.   
 
3.3.2.2.3. Delay 
 
The Delay decision element quantifies the balance between the amount of time for an attack to 
reach its full effect and the time before a response occurs.  This decision element is a latent effect 
to Asset Security.  Three decision elements are latent effects to Delay.  They are Critical Attack 
Time, Time to Respond, and Physical Security.  These have weights of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.25.  
Note that the weighting values for Critical Attack Time, Time to Respond and Physical Security 
are scaled to represent equivalent times. Thus, the Time to Respond weight is balanced against 
the Critical Attack Time plus the Physical Security time.  Therefore, a high Delay value 
represents the case where a response is likely to occur well before the assailants could 
accomplish their attack, while an intermediate value represents the case where the response and 
attack time are nearly equal.  The aggregation used for the decision element Delay uses Equation 
2, where the slope parameter (a) equals 10.5 and the shift parameter is set to 0.5.   
 
The decision element Critical Attack Time is a measure of the time it takes an assailant to carry 
out the attack. This decision element is made up of two direct inputs, Time to Implement Attack 
and Time for Attack to Impact.  These have weights of 0.2 and 0.8.  The Time for Attack to 
Impact is weighted more heavily since this time impact is generally much longer (i.e., 4 times) 
than the time to implement the attack.  Critical Attack Time is aggregated using a liner sum of 
the direct inputs (Equation 3).  
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The next decision element that feeds into Delay is Time to Respond.  This decision element is a 
measure of the time required to respond to an attack.  Direct inputs to this decision element 
include Response Time, Detection Time, and Decision Time with weights of 0.1, 0.3 and 0.3.  
Furthermore, Security Environment is a latent effect to Time to Respond with a weighting factor 
of 0.3, since the culture of the water utility can effect the time it takes for personnel to respond to 
an event.  In the model, these direct inputs are represented as 1-Response Time, 1- Detection 
Time, and 1-Decision Time.  This is deliberate since in the elicitation guides an immediate 
response, detection, or decision yields a zero value and an infinite time yields a value of one (i.e. 
they increase with time).  However, the structure of the model is such that short decision times 
improve security; that is, a short time to respond and long critical attack time leads to high delay 
scores, while long time to respond and short critical attack time lead to low delay times. The 
decision element Time to Respond is aggregated using a liner sum of the direct inputs (Equation 
3). 
 
The last decision element that feeds into Delay is Physical Security.  This element represents the 
delay measures that an assailant would have to breach in order to carry out a successful attack.  
This decision element has four direct inputs.  These represent the overall physical security of the 
site and are:  Asset Barriers, Distance to Asset Access Limitations, and Difficulty to Deliver 
Weapon.  These have weights of 0.2, 0.1, 0.4, and 0.2 corresponding to the relative time delay 
associated with each security element.  In addition to these direct inputs, Detection is a latent 
effect to Delay with a weighting factor of 0.1.  Detection is a latent effect to Delay because the 
degree of sophistication of the detection network represents a physical security delay to the 
assailant.  Time to Respond is aggregated using a liner sum of the direct inputs (Equation 3). 
 
3.3.2.2.4. Response 
 
Unlike Detection, both the Delay and Response elements are latent effects of Asset Security.  
This structure reflects the relationship that the overall asset security of a system depends on 
whether or not a response will occur and that the response will occur before the attack reaches its 
full effect.  For example, a high score for Asset Security represents the case where a mitigating 
response is likely to occur and will occur well before the attack takes effect.   
 
The Response decision element measures both the type of response and the likelihood of a 
response.  Response also involves actions taken by a security force (guards, police or other law 
enforcement) to prevent an assailants’ success (AwwaRF, 2002).  The decision element 
Response is composed of the two decision elements Response Strength and Likelihood of 
Response with weights of 0.4 and 0.6.  Note that the input Likelihood of Response is weighted 
more heavily, 0.6, than the Response Strength, 0.4, given that the strength of the response does 
not matter if no response occurs.  Response is aggregated using a liner sum of these direct inputs 
(Equation 3).   
 
The decision element Response Strength is defined by the decision elements Team 
Qualifications, Response Force, and Response Weapons.  These are weighted 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3 
and are aggregated using a linear weighted sum.  This weighting signifies that it is more 
important to have well qualified people who are highly capable rather than a large response 
force.   
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The decision element Team Qualifications is a measure of the training that both the assailant and 
the responder have.  This decision element is made up of direct inputs Assailant Training and 
Responders Training.  These inputs are a balance of each other and the decision element Team 
Qualifications is aggregated using Equation 5 where the slope parameter (a) equals 30 and the 
shift parameter (b) is set to 0.8.  This methodology is used so that the function behaves like a 
step function with the intention that the assailant’s training is balanced against the responder’s 
training.  For example, if the responder’s training is better than the assailant’s training a value of 
one is yielded therefore increasing the overall System Effectiveness value.   
 
The next decision element that makes up Response is Response Force.  Response Force is a 
measure of the number of assailants versus the number of responders for an event.  The direct 
inputs into Response Force are Number of Assailants and Number of Responders.  These inputs 
are also a balance of each other and the decision element Response Force is aggregated using 
Equation 5 where the slope parameter (a) equals 30 and the shift parameter (b) is set to 0.8.  This 
methodology is also used in this case so that the function behaves like a step function with the 
intention that the number of assailants is balanced against the number of responders.   
 
The final decision element that feeds into Response Strength is Response Weapons.  This 
measures the weapons that the assailant has versus the weapons that the responders have.  The 
direct inputs into Response Weapons are Assailant Weapons and Responders Weapons.  These 
inputs are also a balance of each other where the decision element Response Weapons is 
aggregated using Equation 5 where the slope parameter (a) equals 30 and the shift parameter (b) 
is set to 0.8.   
 
The last decision element that feeds into Response is Likelihood of Response.  This decision 
element is a measure of how likely it is that a response will occur.  Likelihood of Response is a 
function of the direct inputs Response Procedures, Dedicated Response Personnel and the latent 
effects Detection and Security Environment.  These inputs have weights of 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, and 0.2.  
Note that Detection is half the weight of this decision element because without detection it is 
unlikely that any type of response will take place.  Moreover, the decision element Security 
Environment is a latent effect because the environment that the utility personnel work in can 
have a significant influence over how likely it is that a response occurs.  Likelihood of Response 
is aggregated using a liner sum of the direct inputs (Equation 3).   
 
3.4. Software Environment 
 
The MLE model presented here is implemented within the commercial spreadsheet package, 
Microsoft Excel.  Interactive interfaces have been developed using Visual Basic.  These 
interfaces provide the user with a set of menu driven instructions that act as guides through the 
analysis process.  The user has the options to add, modify, or create from existing databases 
assailants, weapons, assets, and security environments.  Specifically, to initially add any of these 
elements, the user queries each of the elicitation guides makes a selection and saves the inputs.  
These values are then uploaded into the model and a variety of scenarios can be developed.  
Once scenarios are determined, the accompanying calculations are performed and output into the 
overall MLE matrix.  This allows the user to inspect how individual input values affect the 
39 
overall results.  Results of each scenario can be saved, organized and ranked for inspection by 
the user.  Figure 7 depicts the main menu of the interface and the buttons to add or modify 
assailants, weapons, assets and security environments.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.   Example of one of the MLE Model Interfaces 
 
 
3.5. MLE Model Calibration 
 
This MLE model was calibrated using two methods.  The first method was collaboration with 
subject matter experts.  Select individuals from the EPA, water utilities, and local water experts 
reviewed the Asset Security side of the model.  These individuals reviewed the model structure, 
elicitation guides, and/or weighting factors.  Their comments and suggestions were used when 
developing the final version of the Asset Security side of the model.  This collaboration helped in 
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validating the input values, weights, and elicitation guides.  For the Possibility of Attack and 
Assailant Capability portions of the model, collaboration with the Security Department at Sandia 
National Laboratories was conducted to review the inputs and determine from a high level 
perspective if the attribute values were appropriate.  However, specific elements of the Assailant 
Capability part of the model relied mainly on literature reviews of assailants and threat 
assessment studies.   
 
The second calibration method was based on a comparison between actual occurred events and 
the MLE generated threat assessment value.  For this calibration, data from the AwwaRF study 
(Welter, G.J., 2003) was used.  This study documents an assembly of over 250 security incidents 
that have direct relevance to a water system that occurred, were planned, or were threatened.  
Only occurred and planned events were used in the calibration as credibility of the threatened 
(hoax) events was often suspect.  Since the AwwaRF report is classified as confidential and 
proprietary, specific events cannot be identified.  However, in order to create scenarios to 
calibrate the MLE model, multiple groupings of these attacks were developed based on assailant, 
weapon, and asset.  Therefore, based on these three items, scenarios were developed and 
modeled using the MLE model.   
 
From these scenarios, values for assets, assailants, and weapons were input into the MLE model.  
To the extent available, values are based on the information provided in the report and from 
general information available in the open literature.  Asset security related inputs were generally 
assumed to follow normal conditions found within US water utilities.  Model structure, 
weighting values and uncertain input values were then adjusted in a self-consistent fashion until 
a reasonable fit between the MLE model scores and the AwwaRF data was achieved.  
Representation of this data is shown in the following tables.  The specifics are eliminated due to 
the classified nature of the data.   
 
The following tables represent the number of occurred scenarios (as a percentage of the total) 
compared to the threat assessment value that the MLE model generated.  The scenarios are 
grouped by assailant in these tables.   
 
Table 2.  AwwaRF vs. MLE Comparison Assailant=Terrorist  
 
AWWARF COMBINED 
RESULTS OF OCCURRED: 
THREATENED: PLANNED 
MLE Threat 
Assessment 
Score 
AWWARF COMBINED 
RESULTS OF OCCURRED: 
THREATENED: PLANNED 
AwwaRF 
Occurred & 
Threatened 
Events/Total 
Events 
  Terrorist; Tank; Contamination 
(Chem) 0.05 
Terrorist; Tank; Contamination 
(Chem) 0.01 
Terrorist; Water Tank; Bomb       0.02       Terrorist; Water Tank; Bomb               0.00 
  Terrorist; Transmission Lines; 
Bomb 0.02 
Terrorist; Transmission Lines; 
Bomb 0.01 
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Table 3.  AwwaRF vs. MLE Comparison Assailant=Insider 
 
AWWARF COMBINED 
RESULTS OF OCCURRED: 
THREATENED: PLANNED 
MLE Threat 
Assessment Score 
AWWARF COMBINED 
RESULTS OF OCCURRED: 
THREATENED: PLANNED 
AwwaRF Occurred 
& Threatened 
Events/Total Events
Insider; Treatment Plant; Vandalism 0.63 Insider; Treatment Plant; Vandalism 0.07 
Insider; Tank; Contamination (on 
site) 0.44 
Insider; Tank; Contamination (on 
site) 0.03 
Insider; Water Plant; Bomb 0.37 Insider; Water Plant; Bomb 0.01 
Insider; Groundwater Well; 
Contamination (on site) 0.34 
Insider; Groundwater Well; 
Contamination (on site) 0.01 
Insider; Water Tank; Bomb 0.25 Insider; Water Tank; Bomb 0.00 
 
 
Table 4.  AwwaRF vs. MLE Comparison Assailant=Vandal 
 
AWWARF COMBINED RESULTS 
OF OCCURRED: THREATENED: 
PLANNED 
MLE Threat 
Assessment Score 
AWWARF COMBINED RESULTS 
OF OCCURRED: THREATENED: 
PLANNED 
AwwaRF Occurred 
& Threatened 
Events/Total Events
Vandal; Tank; Vandalism 0.80 Vandal; Tank; Vandalism 0.53 
Vandal; Pump Station; Vandalism 0.80 Vandal; Pump Station; Vandalism 0.05 
Vandal; Water Treatment Plant; 
Vandalism 0.77 
Vandal; Water Treatment Plant; 
Vandalism 0.09 
Vandal; Tank; Bomb 0.12 Vandal; Tank; Bomb 0.01 
Vandal; Transmission Lines Bomb 0.04 Vandal; Transmission Lines Bomb 0.03 
Vandal; Tank; Contamination 0.00 Vandal; Tank; Contamination 0.01 
Vandal; Treatment Plant; 
Contamination 0.00 
Vandal; Treatment Plant; 
Contamination 0.01 
 
 
As depicted in Table 2, where a terrorist is the assailant, overall MLE threat scores are very low 
and the actual events that have occurred are essentially zero.  This demonstrates that the MLE 
threat assessment values are reasonable with respect to terrorism events.  Tables 3 and 4 
represent the Insider and Vandal scenarios.  The disparity in the scenarios for these assailants is 
potentially due to lack of reporting occurred events due to the nature of the attacks (AwwaRF, 
2002).  However, the MLE threat assessment values depict that these are the most likely events 
to occur but because of the type of attack, e.g. vandalism, water utilities may not document the 
event due to its lack of severity.  
 
Thus, by reviewing the data and the correlation between the scenarios and understanding the 
reasons for the differences in the Vandal and Insider events, this calibration, demonstrates that 
the equations, weightings, and inputs used in the MLE model are suitable for determining overall 
threat assessment scores.  Additional event data is needed to calibrate the model further.  
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4.  MLE WATER MODEL CASE STUDY 
 
A case study was conducted to demonstrate utilization of the MLE model. Specifically, the 
model is used to show how it can be used in the threat assessment process to demonstrate the 
type of results that are obtained, how they can be interpreted in the context of a threat 
assessment, and how the MLE model can be used to identify mitigation strategies.   
 
4.1. Water Utility Description 
 
The MLE model application was performed for a Generic municipal water distribution system of 
a size that would commonly serve a community of approximately 500,000 customers.  The data 
source for this analysis is the vulnerability assessment performed for the community in 2002 
using the RAM-W methodology.  The primary source of water for this city is groundwater.     
 
4.2. Facility Prioritization 
 
Following the RAM-WTM process (AwwaRF, 2002) water utility assets were prioritized to 
determine which facilities are critical to operation.  Although a utility may have a number of 
assets, there may be duplication of their functions, therefore potentially eliminating the need to 
evaluate all assets.  Thus, using the pairwise methodology, outlined in the RAM- WTM process, 
critical assets are defined based on water utility mission objectives.  Typical objectives for a 
water utility are providing sufficient water to meet fire fighting flows, providing service to 
critical customers, and distributing potable water.  Based on these objectives, twelve critical 
assets were identified.  However, because some assets had similar functions, six assets were 
evaluated in the MLE model.   
 
4.3. Utility Assets Characterization 
 
The assets identified for analysis in the MLE modeling were: a water treatment plant, a water 
storage tank, buried pipeline, pump station, node, and a well.  These assets were then 
characterized by collecting all of the existing security and general features of each asset.  These 
items can include fences, locks, barriers, alarms, accessibility, sensors, asset location, etc.  As 
part of the site characterization, the water utility must also collect information about its security 
policies, procedures, and overall security training at the site.  This includes items such as 
evaluating emergency response plans, access control, and the security culture of the management 
and staff personnel of the facility, e.g. are alarms taken seriously, is security training conducted, 
etc.   
 
The asset “water treatment plant” is a conventional filtration plant.  The most commonly used 
chemicals at this plant are stored onsite in capacities over 100,000-gallons.  The perimeter of this 
facility has a six-foot tall industrial chain link fence with a 3-strand barbed wire outrigger.  All 
gates are sensored and cameras are located at entrance gates so visitors can request access to the 
facility.  An uncovered reservoir is on site.  The control building houses the control room for 
plant operations and all doors are equipped with sensors.  One operator is on duty during off 
hours.  This plant is located outside the city but is accessible by a maintained roadway system.   
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The asset “water storage tank” is a completely enclosed metal roof reservoir.  The entrance hatch 
is sensored and secured with a pad lock.  The perimeter of the facility is secured with a six-foot 
tall chain link fence with a three-strand barbed wire outrigger and gates are sensored.  The 
control and pump rooms are in a block building onsite.  All doors into this building are sensored 
and there is a communication link.  This tank is located in a sparsely populated area.  Water 
utility personnel are not stationed at this location.  These characteristics are typical to all the 
water tanks onsite.  
 
The asset “buried pipeline” is considered the main pipeline from the water treatment facility to 
the distribution system.  This pipeline is assumed buried to a three-foot minimum below grade.  
The line is detectable by conventional methods and does not have a contaminant monitoring 
system associated with it.  The pipeline is located within the street right-of-way.  Disruption (e.g. 
physical damage) to this water line would be noticeable in the control system.  Neither utility nor 
security personnel monitor this length of pipe. The barriers associated with this asset are the 
inherent properties of the pipe, i.e. material type, type of joints, burial depth, etc.  These 
characteristics are typical to all the pipes within the distribution system. 
 
The asset “pump station” is the main booster pump station for the city.  It is located some 
distance away  and is accessible by a maintained road system.  The site does not have personnel 
on site on a regular basis but utility employees occasionally conduct work at this site.  The 
pumps are open to the environment.  There is a six-foot high perimeter fence with three strand 
barbed wire outriggers and sensored gates, but no cameras for alarm assessment.  The block 
building located at this facility houses the controllers and SCADA system.  All doors into this 
building are sensored and there is a communication link.  These characteristics are typical to all 
the pump stations within the distribution system. 
 
The asset “node” is a point in the system where a contaminant can be injected.  These are located 
throughout the distribution system and do not have security or utility personal located at them.  
These are open to the environment and do not have any security features associated with them.  
A typical node is a home connection to the distribution system.  
 
The asset “well” is a typical well with an onsite pump with SCADA controls.  The building 
located on site houses the SCADA and pump controls.  There is a liquid chlorinator onsite for 
water treatment.  The perimeter consists of a six-foot tall chain link fence with three strand 
barbed wire outriggers.  Gates are sensored and padlocked.  A communication link is also 
available.  
 
4.4. Utility Culture Characterization 
 
The utility culture characterization differentiates between a water utility that is highly conscious 
of security aspects of their system and those that have little regard for security measures.  Our 
generic city has some policies and procedures in place related to security, however they are not 
threat-specific nor do they provide enough detail to be effective if an attack on the system 
occurred.  Furthermore, system-wide security training is not conducted.  Employees are granted 
access to all facilities and no background checks are performed.  Separation policies in terms of 
returning keys, badges, changing passwords, etc., do not exist and there is no policy or procedure 
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to confront trespassers.  Alarms are monitored and security policies state that a response should 
take place to investigate all alarms but operators do not always follow these requirements and 
typically dispatch a response only if multiple alarms are received.  Policies do not exist for 
controlling keys, vehicle access, alarm logging, security incidents or unauthorized intrusions.  
This utility has an emergency response plan that is based on the Y2K event, however, it does not 
identify how to manage intentional attacks or provide training on how to respond.   Therefore, 
the security culture of this city is considered low.   
 
4.5. Threat Analysis and Characterization 
 
A threat analysis identifies and describes the types of assailants that may disrupt a water utility 
from performing its missions.  This information is used to analyze how an assailant can attack 
the utility’s assets and can help develop a baseline for the utility to determine the level at which 
they should protect their assets.  To determine the threat for specific attacks, several steps must 
occur.   
 
According to Garcia (2001) the methodology for developing threat definitions consists of three 
basic parts:  
 
1. List the information needed to define the threat. 
2. Collect the threat information on the potential threat. 
3. Organize the information to make it useful. 
 
Listing the threat information includes identifying the type(s) of assailants, that is, defining their 
motivations, goals, tactics, weapons, numbers, and capabilities.  These assailants may include 
insiders, vandals, terrorists, or any type of individual assailant or combination of assailants, as 
long as each is clearly defined.   
 
Sources of threat information can include, but is not limited to, items such as criminal reports, 
intelligence reports, historical data, employee conflicts, and/or expressed threats that are related 
to the water utility.  Defining the potential means that each assailant has available for their use is 
an important part of the threat information since the means can effect the overall outcome of an 
attack.  After this information is collected, it must be organized in a form that is useful to define 
an assailant threat.  The information gathered in this process is based on the RAM-W 
vulnerability assessment and is used to determine input values into the MLE model using the 
elicitation guides. For this case study, three assailants are defined: terrorist, insider, and vandal.  
The following paragraphs describe each of these assailants.   
 
A terrorist is defined as an organized, highly motivated group of up to five outsiders equipped 
with sophisticated tools, explosives (larger than backpack quantities e.g. truck bombs), and 
chemical, biological and radiological agents.  All equipment is person portable and easily 
obtainable.  They have extensive knowledge of the security system and of the water operations.  
They can work as a single unit or in teams to achieve their goals.  Their goal is to use their 
materials with the intent to cause massive deaths/illnesses and disrupt water distribution.   
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An insider is defined as a single motivated disgruntled employee or authorized contractor 
working unaccompanied with authorized access, possessing extensive knowledge of the water 
system, the security system and security procedures.  The insider has access to hand and power 
tools and authorization to access the chemicals available at the water utility.  The types of agents 
that are available to an insider are those on the open market.  The insider’s goal is to inhibit 
delivery of water by damaging or manipulating assets or to introduce substances (primarily 
onsite chemicals) into the water supply to disrupt utility operations but with limited physical 
harm to the general public.  
 
A vandal is defined as one or two outsiders, with no authorized access or inside information, 
using portable hand tools with the intent to inflict physical damage to the water utility facility or 
theft of water utility property or equipment.  The types of weapons that are available to a vandal 
are those on the open market.  These outsiders do not intend to cause physical harm to water 
utility employees or to end-users.   
 
The means that will be used in this case study for each of the assailants are: bombs, 
contamination, on site chemicals, biological contamination  and chemical contamination..  The 
act of  “vandalism” (e.g. damage to an asset with spray paint) will also be evaluated. 
 
4.6. Threat Scenarios 
 
Once the water utility has defined critical assets, assailants, attack means, and its security culture, 
it must decide what threat assessment scenarios to evaluate.  A scenario consists of an assailant, a 
attack means, an asset and a utility environment.  For example, a vandal with a can of spray paint 
intended for use on a water storage tank in a culture that does not have much concern for 
security.  The scenarios used in this research are composed of the combination of the previously 
defined assets (water treatment plant, water storage tank, buried pipeline, pump station, node, 
and well), assailants (terrorist, insider, and vandal), and means (bomb, on site chemical 
contamination, biological contamination, chemical contamination, and vandalism) in a security 
environment where the concern for security is low.   This research also evaluated these scenarios 
in a high security environment to note how the latent effects of the culture of the utility can affect 
the overall threat assessment value.  Therefore, this study identifies 72 varying scenarios to 
evaluate and rank based on the overall threat assessment score.  Note that each of the scenarios is 
modeled twice, first using a low security environment and then again using a high security 
environment, resulting in 144 combined scenarios.  Scenarios are listed in Table 5.  
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Table 5.  List of Scenarios 
Assailant Weapon Asset Utility Environment 
Terrorist Bomb Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Insider  Bomb Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Bomb Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Terrorist On Site Chemical Contamination Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Insider  On Site Chemical Contamination Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Vandal  On Site Chemical Contamination Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Biological Contamination  Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Insider  Biological Contamination Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Biological Contamination  Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Chemical Contamination  Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Insider  Chemical Contamination  Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Chemical Contamination  Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Vandalism Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Insider  Vandalism Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Vandalism Treatment Plant  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Bomb Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Insider  Bomb Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Bomb Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Terrorist On Site Chemical Contamination Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Insider  On Site Chemical Contamination Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Vandal  On Site Chemical Contamination Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Biological Contamination  Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Insider  Biological Contamination Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Biological Contamination  Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Chemical Contamination  Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Insider  Chemical Contamination  Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Chemical Contamination  Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Vandalism Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Insider  Vandalism Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Vandalism Water Storage Tank  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Bomb Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Insider  Bomb Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Bomb Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Terrorist On Site Chemical Contamination Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Insider  On Site Chemical Contamination Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Vandal  On Site Chemical Contamination Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Biological Contamination  Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Insider  Biological Contamination  Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Biological Contamination Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
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Table 5. continued:  List of Scenarios 
Assailant Weapon Asset Utility Environment
Terrorist Chemical Contamination  Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Insider  Chemical Contamination Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Chemical Contamination  Transmission Pipeline  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Bomb Pump Station  Low/High Security 
Insider  Bomb Pump Station  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Bomb Pump Station  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Vandalism Pump Station  Low/High Security 
Insider  Vandalism Pump Station  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Vandalism Pump Station  Low/High Security 
Terrorist On Site Chemical Contamination Node  Low/High Security 
Insider  On Site Chemical Contamination Node  Low/High Security 
Vandal  On Site Chemical Contamination Node  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Biological Contamination  Node  Low/High Security 
Insider  Biological Contamination Node  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Biological Contamination  Node  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Chemical Contamination  Node  Low/High Security 
Insider  Chemical Contamination  Node  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Chemical Contamination  Node  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Bomb Well  Low/High Security 
Insider  Bomb Well  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Bomb Well  Low/High Security 
Terrorist On Site Chemical Contamination Well  Low/High Security 
Insider  On Site Chemical Contamination Well  Low/High Security 
Vandal  On Site Chemical Contamination Well  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Biological Contamination  Well  Low/High Security 
Insider  Biological Contamination  Well  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Biological Contamination  Well  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Chemical Contamination  Well  Low/High Security 
Insider  Chemical Contamination  Well  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Chemical Contamination  Well  Low/High Security 
Terrorist Vandalism Well  Low/High Security 
Insider  Vandalism Well  Low/High Security 
Vandal  Vandalism Well  Low/High Security 
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4.6.1. Input Values 
 
To model a particular threat scenario, each of the 79 attribute values are quantified and input into 
the model.  These input values are determined with the aid of elicitation guides (e.g., Figure 4).  
All elicitation guides used in this MLE model are included in the appendix of this document for 
reference.  Attribute values is determined by comparing the vulnerability assessment 
documentation to the criteria given in each elicitation guide.  The team of individuals that 
provided vulnerability assessment data consisted of a mixture of Sandia National Laboratories 
security, operational, and risk assessment methodology personnel, and personnel from water 
utilities that possessed a clear and detailed understanding of the history and operations of a utility 
facility.  Attribute values used in the assessment of each of the threat scenarios are given in 
Tables 6 to 10. 
 
With respect to each attribute associated with the assailant’s capabilities and efforts, higher 
values represent that the assailant is more capable, has stronger desires, or his efforts are greater.  
Scores are also dependant on the type of weapon used by each assailant.  In general, scores are 
typically high for a terrorist and low for an insider or a vandal. See Table 6 for assailant input 
values.  
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Table 6.  Assailant Input Values 
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Input Attribute  Input Value 
Input 
Value 
Input 
Value 
Input 
Value 
Input 
Value 
Input  
Value 
Input 
Value 
Desired Attention 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Desired Health Impact 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Desired Economic Impact 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Desired Level of Disruption 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Assailant Weapons 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Acclimation Needed 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 
Travel Restrictions 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Language Barriers 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Time of Travel 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Profiled Group 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Political Will 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Degree of Planning 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Special Expertise 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.2 
Assailant Training 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Available Funds 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Peer Pressure 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Hatred 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Cause 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Outlook 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
System Knowledge 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
System Accessibility 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Recognition 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Network 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Available Technology 0.7 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 
Number of Assailants 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
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Attribute values for individual Assets vary according to the Detection and Delay features of each 
asset.  For example, values tend to be higher at the treatment plant where there are multiple 
forms of monitoring (e.g., on site security and personnel, video/alarm systems, in-line sensors) 
and much lower for a node or a pipe.  Moreover, these input values are dependent on the type of 
threat scenario being modeled.  For example, since sensors cannot detect bombs or vandalism 
their values are set to zero, whereas for contamination events, which be detected, these values 
range from 0.2 to 0.8.  The attribute value Detection is similar because a bomb is immediately 
detected whereas contaminants in the water can take some time to be detected in the system.  See 
Table 7 for asset input values. 
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Table 7.  Asset Input Values 
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Asset/Weapon Input Values 
Treatment 
Plant/ Bomb 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5
Treatment 
Plant/ 
Contamination 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5
Treatment 
Plant/ 
Vandalism 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5
Water Storage 
Tank/ Bomb 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Water Storage 
Tank/ 
Contamination 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Water Storage 
Tank/ 
Vandalism 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Transmission 
Pipeline/ Bomb 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0
Transmission 
Pipeline/ 
Contamination 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0
Pump Station/ 
Bomb 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3
Pump Station/ 
Vandalism 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Node/ 
Contamination 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Well/ Bomb 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Well/ 
Contamination 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Well/ 
Vandalism 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
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Input values for the biological and chemical weapons are based on Teter’s report (Teter, D.M., 
2003).  The input values for a bomb, on-site contamination, and vandalism are based on the 
elicitation guides.  For each attribute, higher values represent more difficulty in obtaining the 
weapon, greater risk to the assailant using the weapon, and more difficultly in disseminating and 
delivering the weapon.  In general, values are higher for a contamination event than for a bomb 
or vandalism.  See Table 8 for weapon input values. 
 
Table 8.  Means Input Values 
 
 
Limitation to 
Means 
Availability 
Threat to 
Assailant 
Difficulty of 
Dissemination 
Difficulty to 
Deliver 
Means 
Type of Weapon Input Values 
Explosive 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 
On Site Chemical Contamination 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 
Biological Contamination  0.5 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Chemical Contamination 0.3 0.2 1.0 1.0 
Vandalism 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
 
 
Attribute values for the Utility Environment elements for a Low Security Environment are 
constant because these elements deal with characteristics associated with the utility as a whole.  
However, the level of federal involvement would be higher for a terrorist than for an insider or 
vandal attack, so this value differs.  In the High Security scenario, all input values are constant 
for all assailants.  In general, values are low for the Low Security scenario because the utility has 
a relatively poor respect for security-related issues and is poorly prepared to respond to a threat 
event.  See Table 9 for input values.  
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Table 9.  Utility Environment Values 
 
  Low Security 
Terrorist 
Low Security 
Vandal 
Low Security 
Insider High Security
Input Attribute Input Values 
Strength of Police Force 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Federal Level of Involvement 1.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 
Responders Training 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 
Number of Responders 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 
Responders Weapons 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 
Response Procedures 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Dedicated Response Personnel 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Employee Culture 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Employee Training 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Management Culture 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Management Training 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Intelligence  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
Attribute values used for the Final Scenario values are dependent on all aspects of the scenario, 
e.g. assailant, means, and asset.  These values also represent the consequence of the attack, e.g. 
the cost to repair an asset if damaged by a bomb or the number of people affected by an attack.  
Values are high in cases, for example, where the cost of attack is high, or many people are 
affected.  See Table 10 for input values for each scenario.  Note that these values are constant in 
the high and low utility environments.  
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Table 10.  Final Scenario Values 
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Scenario Name Input Values 
Terrorist/Treatment Plant/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Insider/Treatment Plant/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Vandal/Treatment Plant/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Terrorist/Treatment 
Plant/Contamination 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Insider/Treatment Plant/ 
Contamination 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Vandal/Treatment Plant/ 
Contamination 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Terrorist/Treatment 
Plant/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Insider/Treatment Plant/ 
Contamination(Bio) 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Vandal/Treatment Plant/ 
Contamination (Bio) 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Terrorist/Treatment 
Plant/Contamination (Chem) 
1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Insider/Treatment Plant/ 
Contamination (Chem) 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Vandal/Treatment Plant/ 
Contamination (Chem) 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
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Scenario Name Input Values 
Terrorist/Treatment 
Plant/Vandalism 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Insider/Treatment Plant/ Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Vandal/Treatment Plant/Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Terrorist/Water Storage 
Tank/Bomb 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Insider/Water Storage Tank/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Vandal/Water Storage Tank/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.0
Terrorist/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Insider/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Vandal/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Terrorist/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Insider/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Vandal/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
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Scenario Name Input Values 
Terrorist/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination (Chem) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Insider/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination (Chem) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Vandal/Water Storage 
Tank/Contamination (Chem) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Terrorist/Water Storage 
Tank/Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Insider/Water Storage 
Tank/Vandalism 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Vandal/Water Storage 
Tank/Vandalism 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Terrorist/Transmission 
Pipeline/Bomb 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.0
 Insider/Transmission 
Pipeline/Bomb 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.0
Vandal/Transmission 
Pipeline/Bomb 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.0
Terrorist/Pipeline/Contamination 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Insider/Pipeline/Contamination 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Vandal/Pipeline/Contamination 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
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Scenario Name Input Values 
Terrorist/Pipeline/Contamination 
(Bio) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Insider/Pipeline/Contamination 
(Bio) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Vandal/Pipeline/Contamination 
(Bio) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Terrorist/Pipeline/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Insider/Pipeline/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Vandal/Pipeline/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1
Terrorist/Pump Station/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Insider/Pump Station/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Vandal/Pump Station/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Terrorist/Pump Station/ Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Insider/Pump Station/Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Vandal/Pump Station/Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Terrorist/Node/Contamination 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Insider/Node/Contamination 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Vandal/Node/Contamination 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
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Scenario Name Input Values 
Terrorist/Node/Contamination 
(Bio) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Insider/Node/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Vandal/Node/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Terrorist/Node/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Insider/Node/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Vandal/Node/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1
Terrorist/Well/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Insider/Well/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Vandal/Well/Bomb 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0
Terrorist/Well/Contamination 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Insider/Well/Contamination 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Vandal/Well/Contamination 
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Terrorist/Well/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
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Scenario Name Input Values 
Insider/Well/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Vandal/Well/Contamination (Bio) 
1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Terrorist/Well/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Insider/Well/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Vandal/Well/Contamination 
(Chem) 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
Terrorist/Well/Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Insider/Well/Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
Vandal/Well/Vandalism 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0
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4.8. Case Study Results 
 
Utilizing all values within each scenario described in the previous tables, threat assessment 
values are calculated using the aggregation schemes described in the previous sections.  To 
organize the results of this case study, the model is broken down by its two parts, Possibility of 
Attack and System Effectiveness.  Breaking down the results into these categories allows the 
significance of these portions of the model to be recognized.  Following the analysis of these two 
elements, overall threat assessment scores are discussed.  
 
4.8.1. Possibility of Attack Decision Element Values 
 
As discussed previously, the Possibility of Attack side of the model is a measure of the overall 
possibility that a specific attack will take place.  Since this side of the model is a balance 
between Assailant Perceived Consequence and Assailant Efforts, it recognizes that the level of 
effort required by the attack must be compatible with the perceived payoff.   
 
4.8.1.1. Assailant Perceived Consequence 
 
The Assailant Perceived Consequence portion of the model is the measure of the payoff or return 
that the assailant perceives will occur because of the attack.  This part of the model is based on 
the decision elements Attention Goals, Health Goals, Economic Goals, and Disruption Goals.  
The values listed in Table 11 reflect the aggregation of these decision elements for each scenario 
evaluated.   
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Table 11.  Assailant Perceived Consequence Values 
 
Scenario 
Assailant Perceived Consequence
Calculated Value 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.69 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.69 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.69 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.69 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.58 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.50 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.50 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.50 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.50 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.45 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.45 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.45 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.45 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.42 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.42 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Chem 0.40 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.40 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.40 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.40 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.36 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.35 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.32 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.31 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.31 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.30 
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Scenario 
Assailant Perceived Consequence
Calculated Value 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.30 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.30 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.22 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.20 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.18 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.18 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.18 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 
Chem 0.18 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.15 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.15 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.12 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.04 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.04 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.04 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.04 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.00 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.00 
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Scenario 
Assailant Perceived Consequence
Calculated Value 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.00 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.00 
 
As shown in Table 11, there tends to be groupings of particular types of scenarios with respect to 
the Assailant Perceived Consequence values.  The first grouping in the range of 0.69 and 0.50 
are those scenarios conducted  by a vandal using a bomb or vandalism.  One of the reasons that 
all of the scenarios ranked in the top category is because vandals have very low desires.  
Referring to Table 6, Assailant Input Values, the vandal has the lowest desires for any particular 
attack scenario.  Therefore, due to the aggregation applied for these decision elements, when a 
goal is met, e.g. the perceived attack impact meets the assailant’s goals, as in vandalism events, 
the overall value for Assailant Perceived Consequence increases. 
 
The next grouping of values includes the scenarios associated with primarily insider or vandal 
contamination events at multiple assets.  The reason the values in this range, 0.45-0.22, are 
higher than other types of events is again because when goals are met based on the assailant’s 
desires, Assailant Perceived Consequence increases.  Also, this category includes many of the 
biological and chemical agent attacks.  The reason these are grouped within this range due to the 
number of illnesses or deaths that occur if these agents are used.  This component of Heath 
Effects then increases therefore increasing Assailant Perceived Consequence.   
 
The next group of values includes those scenarios with an Assailant Perceived Consequence 
value of 0.20.  These scenarios include the Insider scenarios associated with a bomb or 
vandalism as a weapon.  The reason these are ranked as only a 0.2 in terms of consequence, is 
because an Insider has a greater ability to disrupt the water system by more sophisticated means 
than vandalism or a bomb, e.g. contamination. 
 
The next group of values includes those scenarios with an Assailant Perceived Consequence 
value of 0.18-0.04.  For the most part, these scenarios include Terrorist scenarios associated with 
a biological or chemical agents.  The reason these are ranked in this category, is because a 
Terrorist typically wants to disrupt the water system in a broader range, e.g. via a treatment plant 
that serves a larger population.  
 
The last group of values includes those scenarios with an Assailant Perceived Consequence value 
of 0.0.  For the most part, these scenarios include Terrorist scenarios associated with vandalism, 
bombs or onsite contamination.  The reason these are ranked so low (zero perceived 
consequence), is also because Terrorists typically want to disrupt the water system in a broader 
range, e.g. via biological or chemical weapons.  
 
All of these Assailant Perceived Consequence values will be balanced against the Assailant 
Effort values to determine the Possibility of Attack Value.   
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4.8.1.2 Assailant Efforts 
 
The Assailant Efforts portion of the model measures the amount of effort that an assailant will 
have to devote to the attack.  Assailant Efforts is comprised of the three decision elements Asset 
Locality, Chance of Assailant Being Caught, Assailant Capability.  The values in Table 12 
reflect the aggregation of these decision elements.  Note, the values shown are 1-Assailant 
Efforts, therefore indicating that the higher the value the easier the attack is for the assailant, e.g. 
efforts are low.   
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Table 12.  Assailant Efforts Values 
 
Scenario Name 
1-Assailant 
Efforts 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.91 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.91 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.91 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.91 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.91 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.91 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.91 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.88 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.88 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.76 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.76 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.76 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Chem  0.76 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.76 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.76 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.76 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.76 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.76 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.76 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.74 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.74 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.74 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.74 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.66 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.66 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.66 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.66 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.66 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.52 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.51 
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Scenario Name 
1-Assailant 
Efforts 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.51 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.51 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.51 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.49 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.49 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.47 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.47 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.46 
68 
Scenario Name 
1-Assailant 
Efforts 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.46 
 
As was the case in Assailant Perceived Consequence, there are also distinct groupings within the 
Assailant Efforts portion of the model.  However, the assailant and the weapon more specifically 
determine these groupings.  The first grouping includes values 0.91-0.88, which consists of 
vandalism scenarios conducted by an insider and on-site chemical contamination events by an 
insider.  These represent the scenarios that take the least amount of effort for this assailant.  
Therefore, an Insider has a low value for Asset Locality (don’t have restrictions or a distance to 
travel, learn a language, become acclimated, etc.), has little chance of being caught, and a high 
capability to carry out that type of attack.   
 
The next grouping of scenarios has the value of 0.76.  This grouping includes all of the insider 
events where a biological or chemical contaminant is the associated weapon.  The reason these 
are grouped at a somewhat low effort, is because if an insider had access to these types of 
weapons, his ability to distribute them into the water system would not take as much effort as a 
vandal or a terrorist since an insider has the access, qualifications, and other means to perform 
this task.   
 
The next group in this category includes those scenarios associated predominantly with a vandal, 
an insider and a terrorist with bombs and on-site contamination in the range of 0.74-0.49.  The 
range of attacks becomes more difficult for the individual assailants as the weapon becomes 
more difficult, e.g. a vandal attack with vandalism has lower efforts (0.74) than a vandal attack 
with a bomb (0.49). The terrorist scenarios also fall with in this range since he still has to manage 
items such as becoming familiar with the site, potentially learning a language, being part of a 
profiled group, and all the other decision elements within the Assailant Efforts portion of the 
model, even though the weapon is easy for a terrorist.  
 
The last group of scenarios includes those associated with a vandal or a terrorist using a 
biological or chemical weapon with Assailant Effort scores of 0.47-0.46.   The reason these are 
grouped at the highest effort, is because if a vandal or terrorist had access to these types of 
weapons, his ability to distribute them into the water system would be more difficult than that of 
an insider.  However, access to the weapon is key in these types of events.   
 
4.8.2 Overall Possibility of Attack (Pa) Values 
 
The Possibility of Attack value is determined by balance of Assailant Perceived Consequence 
and Assailant Efforts.  Therefore, Table 13 shows all of the scenarios and their ranks with respect 
to the possibility of how likely each particular scenario will occur.   
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Table 13.  Possibility of Attack Values (Pa) 
 
Scenario Name 
Possibility of Attack 
(Pa) 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.97 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.96 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.96 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.96 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.86 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.86 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.70 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.70 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.70 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.70 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.65 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.65 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.61 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.61 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.52 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.48 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.47 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.47 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.47 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.29 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.29 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.25 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.23 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.15 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.15 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.06 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.06 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.06 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.06 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.02 
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Scenario Name Possibility of Attack (Pa)
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.01 
 
As shown in Table 13, there are clear groupings of scenarios.  These groupings illustrate the 
overall possibility of attack with respect to the assailant and the means used.  The first grouping 
includes the scenarios with a vandal and an insider as assailants.  These values, 0.97-0.70, are 
expected for a Possibility of Attack value since the vandal and the insider have high perceived 
consequence values and require the least amount of efforts for these particular attacks.  It is also 
demonstrated within this grouping the most likely means to be used by their relative order of 
ease.  In all of the groupings, the means become more difficult as the Pa value decreases.  For 
example, the Pa value is higher in the case where the assailant is using vandalism but is lower 
when he is using Chem/Bio contamination which may be more difficult to obtain.  
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The second grouping includes those scenarios that involve a terrorist as the assailant.  These 
scenarios range in values of 0.15-0.02.  Within these scenarios, contamination events with 
biological or chemical weapons are the most likely for a terrorist since they have the highest 
perceived consequence whereas a vandalism attack does not produce the consequence a terrorist 
desires.   
 
The last grouping in this category includes the scenarios associated with a vandal and an insider 
as the assailant using a biological or chemical contamination.  The score of 0.01 represents that 
these types of attacks are the least likely to occur because these assailants typically do not have 
access to these type of agent.  The reason this value is not set to zero is to indicate that there can 
be a very minor possibility that these assailants could have access to this type of agent, therefore 
not completely eliminating these events from occurring.   
 
4.8.3. System Effectiveness Decision Element Values 
 
The System Effectiveness side of the model is a balance between the Assailants Capability and 
Asset Security.  Since this side of the model is a balance between these two elements, it 
recognizes the overall balance between assailant capability and asset security. For example, a 
highly secured asset balanced against an unqualified assailant would result in a high System 
Effectiveness score, which would then decrease the overall Threat Assessment score.   
 
4.8.3.1. Assailant Capability 
 
The Assailant Capability portion of the model measures how capable the assailant is with respect 
to an attack.  The decision elements that relate to the overall capabilities of the assailant are items 
such as the assailants’ qualifications, motivations, amount of funding available, technical 
abilities, personnel and means available, and ability to access the asset.  The values in Table 14 
reflect the aggregation of these decision elements.  Note, the values shown are 1-Assailant 
Capability, therefore indicating that the larger the value the less capable the assailant is to carry 
out an attack.  Reasoning for the reverse of these values is discussed in prior sections. 
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Table 14.  Assailant Capability Values 
 
Scenario Name 
1-Assailant 
Capability 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.88 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.78 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.78 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.78 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.78 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.78 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.61 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.61 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.61 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.61 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.61 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.41 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.41 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.41 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.41 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.41 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Chem 0.41 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.41 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.41 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.41 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.41 
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Scenario Name 
1-Assailant 
Capability 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.38 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.38 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.38 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.38 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.30 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.25 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.16 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.16 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.11 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.11 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.11 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.11 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.11 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.11 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.11 
 
74 
The groupings in this category are dependent on the Means used in the attack and the assailant.  
The first grouping includes values 0.88-0.78, which consists of the scenarios conducted by a 
vandal with biological and chemical agents, on-site contamination and bombs.  Vandalism does 
not rank in this grouping because it is a much easier attack than an attack with a bomb or 
contamination.  Within this grouping the high values indicate those attacks were the assailant is 
the least capable.  This ranking is determined by the means used and the asset attacked, e.g. a 
water treatment plant has more security features than a tank and injecting a biological or 
chemical agent at this location is the most difficult attack for a vandal.   
 
The next grouping of scenarios has values from 0.61-0.41.  This grouping includes insider 
scenarios except vandalism and on-site contamination as weapons.  Vandalism and on site 
contamination do not fall in this grouping for an insider since an insider’s capability is greater in 
these areas.   
 
The next grouping in this category includes those scenarios associated with a vandal using 
vandalism as a means at a score of 0.38.  These rank as the easiest attack for a vandal since this 
type of attack is in line with their area of expertise.   
 
The next group of scenarios includes the terrorist scenarios using biological and chemical agents, 
bombs, onsite contamination and vandalism.  The values for these scenarios range from 0.30-
0.25, ranking biological and chemical attacks the most difficult and vandalism and bomb events 
as the easiest for a terrorist.   
 
The final grouping includes the insider vandalism and onsite contamination scenarios.  The 
values associated with this group range from 0.16-0.11.  This represents the insider being the 
most highly qualified when using onsite contamination and vandalism as attack means.  Some of 
the reasons that an insider is the most capable in these events is because he has access to the 
facility and chemicals, does not need any particular training or specialized weapons, already has 
training associated with injecting chemicals, does not need much funding, and can be very 
motivated.   
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4.8.3.2 Asset Security 
 
Asset Security is a measure of how secure an asset is with respect to an attack.  The decision 
elements that make up the Asset Security side of the model take into account the detection 
abilities of the asset (Detect), the delay functions of the asset (Delay) the response capabilities of 
the water utility and community (Response) and the culture of the water utility (Security 
Environment).  Large aggregate scores reflect good security.  The values in Table 15 reflect the 
ranked aggregation of these decision elements. 
 
Table 15.  Asset Security Values 
 
Scenario Name Asset Security 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.52 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.52 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.52 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.46 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.46 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.42 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.42 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.41 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.41 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.41 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.41 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.41 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.41 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.39 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.39 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.38 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.38 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.38 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.37 
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Scenario Name Asset Security 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.37 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.37 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.37 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.37 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.31 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.31 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.31 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.31 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.31 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.31 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.28 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.28 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.28 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.28 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.28 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.28 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.27 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.27 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.27 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.24 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.24 
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.24 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.22 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.22 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Chem 0.22 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.22 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.19 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.19 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.19 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.19 
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Scenario Name Asset Security
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.18 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.10 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.08 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.08 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.08 
 
The groupings for Asset Security are dependent on the asset, the assailant and the means used in 
the attack.  The higher the Asset Security value the more secure the asset is to the associated 
attack.  Therefore, in general the least protected assets are those that are in conjunction with a 
terrorist.  This is due to the terrorist having more training than the response force, therefore 
reducing the Response decision element, and the low security environment.  Moreover, assets 
that do not have detection instruments associated with them or are located in areas where 
response is slow, for example water tanks or wells, can contribute to lower Asset Security values.  
Conversely, the most protected asset is typically the water treatment plant.  This is partially due 
to the Detection (video, sensors, on site security/personnel), Delay (physical security of the site), 
and Response attribute values associated with this asset.  Furthermore, the contamination events 
have higher asset security values, again, due to the Detection, Delay and Response attributes of 
these scenarios.  Overall, the vandalism scenarios rank low for Asset Security.  Since the assets, 
wells, tanks, and pump stations, typically don’t have any detection or response methods for this 
type of attack these scenarios rank second lowest, next to a terrorist in Asset Security.  Lastly, 
the terrorist scenarios rank as the least secure with respect to asset security for the reasons 
mentioned because of the capabilities of the terrorist.   
 
As part of Asset Security the utilities Security Environment is a latent effect to the three decision 
elements, Detect, Delay and Response.  Although all of the scenarios evaluated up to this point 
have used a Low Security environment, changing the Security Environment to High can have an 
affect on not only the Asset Security values but also on the overall threat assessment scores.  
This will be discussed later in this analysis.  
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4.8.4 Overall System Effectiveness (Pe) Values 
 
The System Effectiveness value is a balance between the Assailants Capability and Asset 
Security.  Therefore, Table 16 shows a ranking of each scenario with respect to their overall 
System Effectiveness.  
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Table 16.  System Effectiveness Values (Pe) 
 
Scenario Name 
System 
Effectiveness 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.82 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.82 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.80 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.78 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.76 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.76 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.75 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.75 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.74 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.72 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.72 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.72 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.72 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.72 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.67 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.67 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.67 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.64 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.64 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.59 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.58 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.57 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.53 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.50 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.49 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.34 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.34 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.26 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.26 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.24 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.24 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.24 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.24 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.20 
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Scenario Name 
System 
Effectiveness 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Chem 0.20 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.20 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.17 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.17 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.17 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination  Chem 0.16 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.16 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.15 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.14 
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.13 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.12 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.12 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.12 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.12 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.12 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.12 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.11 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.10 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.10 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.10 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.10 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.10 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.10 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.09 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.09 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.09 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.09 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.08 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.08 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.07 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.07 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.07 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.07 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.07 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.07 
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The groupings for System Effectiveness are dependent on the asset, the assailant, and the weapon 
used in the attack.  The higher the System Effectiveness value better protected the asset is to that 
attack.  Therefore, the first dominant grouping includes the scenarios with the vandal as the 
assailant and the means being contamination and a bomb because a vandal is not very capable in 
these types of scenarios nor does he have access or skills using a bomb or a contaminant.  These 
scenarios have values for System Effectiveness ranging from 0.82 to 0.64.   
 
The next grouping in this category includes mainly those events associated with an insider with 
contamination and bomb as the weapon.  The values associated with these scenarios are 0.59-
0.20.   
 
The subsequent grouping in this category includes the scenarios where a vandal is the assailant 
and vandalism is the means.  This ranking, 0.20-0.17, represents that the asset is not very well 
protected to these types of events 
 
The next category of events includes most of the terrorist scenarios ranking from 0.16 to 0.10.  
This is a low system effectiveness value indicating that most assets in a water system are not 
well protected to a terrorist.  
 
The last categories of scenarios include those with an insider using onsite chemicals for 
contamination and vandalism.  This signifies that water utility assets are most susceptible to 
insider contamination or vandalism events than any other type of attack.  
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4.8.5 Threat Assessment  
 
To reiterate the definition of threat assessment, the MLE model is a top down approach based on 
the equation, Pa(1-Pe).  At the top level, the MLE model is divided into two sections; the 
Possibility of Attack (Pa) and System Effectiveness (Pe).  Therefore the previously calculated 
values in Tables 13 and 16 are those used in the threat assessment equation.  The following table 
(Table 17) ranks the overall Threat Assessment for each scenario.   
 
 
Table 17.  Threat Assessment Values  Pa(1-Pe) 
Scenario Name 
Threat 
Assessment 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.80 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.80 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.80 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.78 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.73 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.65 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.65 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.65 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.64 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.56 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.56 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.37 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.34 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.31 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.26 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.26 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.25 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.13 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.13 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.12 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.12 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.10 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.10 
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Scenario Name 
Threat 
Assessment
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.05 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.01 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.01 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.00 
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Scenario Name 
Threat 
Assessment
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.00 
 
 
The overall Threat Assessment values range from 0.80 to 0.00 and are predominately segregated 
by the assailant.  The higher the Threat Assessment value the greater the threat of that scenario 
occurring.   
 
The first dominant grouping includes the scenarios where the vandal is the assailant using 
vandalism and the insider is the assailant using onsite chemicals and vandalism.  The values in 
his category range from 0.82 to 0.56.  Since these scenarios are associated with a vandal and an 
insider utilizing their strongest skill sets (high Assailant Capability), on assets that are easily 
accessible to them (Asset Security), this demonstrates that a water utility is most vulnerable to 
these types of attacks.  Specifically water utilities should be concerned with vandalism, as these 
are the most likely events to occur.  
 
The second grouping contains primarily the scenarios where an insider is the assailant and the 
means are contamination and a bomb.  The values associated with these scenarios are 0.37-0.35.  
These values represent that these scenarios have a low Threat Assessment value but also depict 
that they are more likely to occur than a terrorist attack or a vandal with a bomb. 
 
The third grouping of scores includes those scenarios associated primarily with a terrorist as the 
assailant using biological or chemical agents, onsite contamination, bombs and vandalism.  
These values range from 0.13-0.02.  These scenarios can be further resolved into subcategories 
noting the specific means used in each scenario, e.g. a terrorist is most likely to contaminate a 
water treatment plant with a biological or chemical agent before he will vandalize an asset or use 
onsite chemicals for contamination.   
 
This last group of scenarios includes those associated with an insider using biological or 
chemical agents and a vandal using any type of contamination agents.  The reason this is the 
lowest threat is because these assailants typically do not have access to these means, therefore 
85 
the likelihood of a threat associated with these means is very low.  Although these values are 
very low with respect to the other scenarios, these types of attacks can still occur and water 
utilities should still consider them to determine appropriate protection measures for their assets.  
 
4.8.6. Discussion 
 
In the previous sections, a MLE model for water utility threat assessment is developed and 
applied to a generic municipal water utility for specific scenarios.  For the most part, as depicted 
in Tables 11 to 17, the overall results of the modeled scenarios reflect the most logical outcomes 
for each of the scenarios.  For example in Table 14, the four most likely threats to a water utility 
is a vandalism of an asset by a vandal.  This is consistent with current problems that many water 
utilities encounter.  Furthermore, the least likely threats are those attacks associated with a 
terrorist and then those where biological and chemical agents are used by an insider or vandal.   
 
Comparing the case study results using the MLE model to the RAM-WTM vulnerability 
assessment is difficult since within the vulnerability assessment the Possibility of Attack value is 
always set at one.  Therefore, the assessments are driven solely by system effectiveness and 
consequence.  However comparisons to the system effectiveness values for some scenarios can 
be drawn.  Table 18 lists the scenarios that can be compared based on the system effectiveness 
scores in the MLE model and the RAM-W model.  Not all scenarios can be compared since the 
RAM-W vulnerability assessment does not consider many of the events that the MLE model 
evaluates.  For example, the RAM-W model does not consider a terrorist event since the RAM-
W study determined that no facility or asset is capable of operating under this level of threat. 
Also Vandalism events in the RAM-W model were considered to damage assets with hand tools, 
and not just spray paint or vandalize the asset.  Furthermore, a contamination event with onsite 
chemicals is considered to be “ineffective” because the quantity of chemicals stored at this utility 
is not large enough to significantly contaminate the system.  Bomb events were also not used in 
the scenarios including a low level vandal or by an insider.  
 
However, the following table of scenarios does indicate moderate changes to the overall threat 
assessment when the Possibility of Attack is calculated rather than assumed to be one.  As 
depicted in Table 18, the overall threat assessment score decreases when Possibility of Attack 
(Pa) is not set to one but is calculated by the MLE methodology.  This is an important feature that 
can help water utilities determine what assets to protect and where the greatest threats may occur.  
If a larger comparison of varying scenarios could have been determined this reduction in Pa 
would provide a better sense of the significance of calculating Pa. 
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Table 18.  MLE vs. RAM-W System Effectiveness Scores 
 
Scenario 
MLE 
(Pa) 
MLE 
(Pe) 
**RAM-W 
(Pe) 
RAM-W 
1*(1-Pe) 
MLE 
Pa*(1-Pe)
Low Security Insider 
Pump Station Vandalism 0.6918 0.0716 0.1000 0.9000  0.6423  
Low Security Vandal 
Pipeline Contamination 0.0100 0.6775 0.9000 0.1000  0.0032  
Low Security Vandal 
Treatment Plant 
Contamination 0.0100 0.7622 0.9000 0.1000  0.0024  
Low Security Vandal 
Water Storage Tank 
Contamination 0.0100 0.6538 0.9000 0.1000  0.0035  
Low Security Vandal 
Well Field 
Contamination 0.0100 0.6482 0.9000 0.1000  0.0035  
**RAM-W only uses a relative ranking for System Effectiveness where 0.1=Low, 
0.5=Medium and 0.9=High 
 
4.8.7 Sensitivity and Importance Analysis 
 
The sensitivity and importance (S & I) analysis feature of this MLE model can help determine 
how sensitive and important specific attributes are to attacks.  The Importance metric allows a 
user to identify those features that most significantly contribute to the success of a threat.  The 
Importance metric is simply calculated by deriving the difference between the output value with 
the input based on actual utility conditions, and the output value when one of the input values has 
been set to zero.  By repeating this process for each input value, the input with the greatest 
influence on the output is determined.  Similarly, the Sensitivity is calculated as the difference 
between the output value with the input based on actual utility conditions, and the output value 
when one of the input values has been set to one.  The Sensitivity metric measures the potential 
for improvement in that input to result in a measurable improvement in the total result. Using the 
sensitivity and importance analysis feature embedded in the model, the user can determine the 
most effective methods for decreasing the likelihood of attack for particular scenarios.  The user 
can model various utility environments to establish methods for improving the security culture of 
the utility to determine areas that can be improved to achieve the most return on investment.   
 
Utilizing these tools, the user can determine the best places within the system to devote time, 
funds, and efforts so that investments are not made in areas where little or no return on 
investment is gained from the improvements.  Thus, from an economic standpoint, these tools 
can help water utilities invest wisely in their assets, personnel and training.  
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Using these calculation methods, a Sensitivity and Importance assessment was performed on the 
72 Low Security scenarios.  In the Appendix section of this report, all of the sensitivity analysis 
data is presented.  Each table is grouped by assailant and weapon and then by asset.  The first 
number in each column is the threat assessment score for that particular scenario with all the 
inputs as originally entered.  The attributes listed, e.g. Duration of Impact, Deaths, etc., are the 
top three attributes in each category (sensitivity or importance) that had the most effect on the 
threat assessment score when that particular attribute was calculated as a zero or a one.  Beneath 
each of the decision elements is the threat assessment score when that decision element was set 
to zero or one.  This value can be compared to the original threat assessment score to determine 
how much of an effect that particular attribute had on the overall threat assessment value.   
 
Based on this analysis it is evident that within each category of assailant and weapons there are 
similarities within each attack regardless of the asset.  In the scenarios where a terrorist is the 
assailant and bomb is the weapon, the most sensitive elements are the decision elements 
Duration of Impact, System Accessibility, and Recognition.  The areas of most importance are:  
Desired Attention, Federal Level of Involvement and Profiled Group.  In the scenarios where an 
insider is the assailant and bomb is a weapon, the most sensitive elements are the decision 
elements Assailant Training, Network, and Detection Time.  The areas of most importance are:  
Required Planning, Special Expertise and Technology Needed.  In the scenarios where a vandal 
is the assailant and bomb is a weapon, the most sensitive elements are the decision elements 
Network, Degree of Planning, and Assailant Training.  The areas of most importance are:  
Required Planning, Special Expertise and Technology Needed.   
 
In the scenarios where a terrorist is the assailant and onsite contamination is the weapon, the 
most sensitive elements are the decision elements Duration of Impact, Deaths, and System 
Accessibility.  The areas of most importance are:  Desired Attention, Federal Level of 
Involvement and Profiled Group.  In the scenarios where an insider is the assailant and an onsite 
chemical is the weapon, the most sensitive elements are the decision elements Deaths, Repair 
Costs, and Economic Disruption.  The areas of most importance are:  Desired Attention and 
Illnesses.  In the scenarios where a vandal is the assailant and an onsite chemical is the weapon, 
the most sensitive elements are the decision elements Means Accessibility, Assailant Training, 
and Decision Time.  The areas of most importance are:  Limitation to means Availability, 
Required Planning and Time for Attack to Impact.   
 
In the scenarios where a terrorist is the assailant and contamination with a biological or Chemical 
agent  is the means, the most sensitive elements are the decision elements Duration of Impact, 
Number of People Impacted, and Repair Costs.  The areas of most importance are:  Desired 
Attention, Federal Level of Involvement and Profiled Group.  In the scenarios where an insider is 
the assailant and contamination with a biological or chemical agent  is the means, the most 
sensitive elements are the decision elements Means Accessibility, Decision Time, and Network.  
The areas of most importance are:  Limitation to Means Availability, and Time for Attack.  In 
the scenarios where a vandal is the assailant and contamination with Anthrax or Cyanide is the 
weapon, the most sensitive elements are the decision elements Means Accessibility, Assailant 
Training, and Available Funds.  The areas of most importance are:  Limitation to Means 
Availability, Required Planning and Time for Attack to Impact.   
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In the scenarios where a terrorist is the assailant and vandalism is the weapon, the most sensitive 
elements are the decision elements System Accessibility, Recognition, and System Knowledge.  
The areas of most importance are:  Desired Attention, Federal Level of Involvement and Profiled 
Group.  In the scenarios where an insider is the assailant and vandalism is the weapon, the most 
sensitive elements are the decision elements Duration of Impact, Number of People Impacted, 
and Peer Pressure.  The areas of most importance are:  Desired Attention, Federal Level of 
Involvement, and Political Will.  In the scenarios where a vandal is the assailant and vandalism is 
the weapon, the most sensitive elements are the decision elements System Knowledge, 
Recognition, and System Accessibility.  The areas of most importance are:  Responders Training, 
Number of Responders and Responders Weapons.   
 
4.8.8 Mitigation Strategy 
 
Based on the sensitivity and importance analysis, and the values that are most dominant in each 
category, strategies to reduce the overall threat assessment are considered.  However many of 
these sensitive and important decision elements are assailant dependent, e.g. the desires of the 
assailant, the Network they are associated with, the Training or Funds they have in addition to 
other assailant specific decision elements.  Unfortunately, these decision elements cannot be 
controlled since they are related to the characteristics of individual assailant.  However, some 
important and sensitive measures were determined that can be controlled.  For example,  System 
Accessibility, Detection & Decision Time, Duration of Impact, and Number of People Impacted.  
As Accessibility becomes easier (e.g. set to a value of 1) the overall threat assessment score 
increases.  This is also the case for Detection & Decision Time as these values increase (e.g. a 
long detection or decision time) the overall threat assessment score increases.  Lastly, as the 
Duration of Impact and Number of People Impacted increase, the overall threat assessment also 
increases.  Therefore to reduce the threat assessment these attributes associated with the asset can 
be improved.  Some improvements can include: hardening the system to reduce the ability for 
assailant to gain access to the asset, accelerate the detection and decision time of responders, and 
build in redundancies into the system so that if one asset is attacked, e.g. a tank, it can be 
bypassed so that the duration of impact and number of people impacted is minimal.  
 
Finally, an overarching strategy to reduce the threat of attack to an asset is to increase the 
Security Environment of the water utility.  This includes the following items: 
• Developing relationships with the local police force and federal government in the 
area so that appropriate measures are taken in the event of an attack,  
• Developing response procedures that establish protocols on how to manage 
attacks 
• Train all personnel including first responders, management and employees 
• Identify appropriate weapons for response personnel in the event of an attack 
• Assign dedicated response personnel to critical assets 
• Change the attitude of the management and employees of the utility to consider 
security a priority 
• Obtain and utilize intelligence regarding threats appropriately.  
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According to a recent article in Opflow (Murphy and Kirmeyer, 2005) improving these types of 
activities can begin to improve system security within the existing budgets, policies, and 
procedures which can then lay the foundation for implementing other more sophisticated security 
systems.  Therefore, an example of how these can improve the threat assessment score, Table 19 
compares a low security environment vs. a high security environment.  
 
 
Table 19. Comparison of Threats for a High Security vs. Low Security Utility 
 
Scenario Name 
High Utility 
Environment: 
Threat 
Assessment 
Low Utility 
Environment: 
Threat 
Assessment 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.62 0.80 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Vandalism 0.61 0.80 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Vandalism 0.61 0.80 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.56 0.78 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.34 0.65 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Vandalism 0.34 0.65 
Low Security Insider Well Field Vandalism 0.34 0.65 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination 0.33 0.73 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.33 0.73 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination 0.19 0.56 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.19 0.56 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Bomb 0.10 0.37 
Low Security Insider Pump Station Bomb 0.07 0.34 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination 0.06 0.26 
Low Security Insider Well Field Bomb 0.06 0.31 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination 0.06 0.25 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.04 0.26 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.03 0.13 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.03 0.13 
Low Security Vandal Pump Station Bomb 0.02 0.13 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.02 0.12 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Bomb 0.01 0.12 
Low Security Insider Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.01 0.10 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Bomb 0.01 0.10 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Bio 0.01 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination Chem 0.01 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.01 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.01 0.05 
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Scenario Name 
High Utility 
Environment: 
Threat 
Assessment 
Low Utility 
Environment: 
Threat 
Assessment 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Vandalism 0.01 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Vandalism 0.01 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Vandalism 0.01 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Vandalism 0.01 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Bio 0.01 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination Chem 0.01 0.02 
Low Security Vandal Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.01 0.05 
Low Security Terrorist Home Contamination 0.01 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pump Station Bomb 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Contamination 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Water Storage Tank Bomb 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Well Field Bomb 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Transmission Pipeline Bomb 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Bomb 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Chem 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Home Contamination Bio 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Terrorist Treatment Plant Contamination 0.00 0.02 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Chem 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Well Field Contamination Bio 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Terrorist Pipeline Contamination 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Insider Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.00 0.01 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Chem 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Home Contamination Bio 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination 0.00 0.00 
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Scenario Name 
High Utility 
Environment: 
Threat 
Assessment 
Low Utility 
Environment: 
Threat 
Assessment 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Chem 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Well Field Contamination Bio 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Chem 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Water Storage Tank Contamination Bio 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Chem 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Pipeline Contamination Bio 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Chem 0.00 0.00 
Low Security Vandal Treatment Plant Contamination Bio 0.00 0.00 
 
 
As indicated in the comparison between a High Security Environment and a Low Security 
Environment, the threat assessment scores for many of the scenarios decrease considerably.  The 
ranking order of the attacks remains fairly constant, e.g. a vandal vandalizing a water tank is still 
the most likely attack to occur, however, the change from a 0.80 score to a 0.62 represents the 
attack is less likely to take place at a utility where the culture of the personnel at a utility 
considers security a priority.  Some of the most significant changes in threat assessment are those 
scenarios where the insider is the assailant.  This comparison especially demonstrates how the 
latent effects of the Security Environment contribute to the overall outcome of the threat 
assessment scenarios.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Water utilities are faced with the daunting task of assessing the vulnerability of their utilities to 
disruption by natural and malevolent acts.  Integral to such effort is threat assessment, which is 
complicated by the lack of data and experience to conduct a full probabilistic assessment.  
Markov Latent Effects modeling is a methodology that avoids these pitfalls by providing a 
possibilistic framework to threat assessment.   
 
There are a number of advantages to MLE modeling. MLE modeling provides a framework for 
utilizing both qualitative and quantitative data to score threat scenarios. Further, these 
calculations are performed within a spreadsheet environment, supported by an interactive, menu-
driven user interface, which makes the model operationally manageable for utility staff and 
management.  MLE modeling also provides a consistent, quantitative basis for evaluating threat 
scenarios.  This allows the head-to-head comparison of results and ultimate ranking of threats.  
Finally, and most importantly, MLE modeling provides a structured framework for integrating 
information from a wide range of disparate sources.  This is important because security cannot be 
assessed from a handful of disjointed methods, rather, security must be assessed from a systems 
perspective.  This is demonstrated by the MLE model (Figure 6).  Specifically, threat assessment 
does not only depend on the security features of the asset alone, but on the assailant, the weapon, 
and the security environment.  Furthermore, by decomposing the entire water system and 
developing a methodology to determine a value for Pa (possibility of attack), it allows one to 
fully evaluate all of the elements that make up a threat assessment.  In this way, MLE modeling 
captures and structures these disparate information sources and aggregates the data to produce a 
truly integrated threat score. 
 
Benefits of using this particular MLE modeling scheme to determine threat assessments for 
water utilities is that it can be used for any type of asset that a water utility owns (i.e. elicitation 
guides and attribute values are not asset specific).  One of the main benefits of using this MLE 
modeling methodology as opposed to other methods is not having to determine actual 
probabilities.  This is key since lack of data makes calculating probabilities difficult, especially 
when trying to determine threat assessments for willful attacks to an asset.  MLE modeling also 
allows the user to calculate the Possibility of Attack (Pa) value rather than always assume a 
worst-case situation.  This also provides a more realistic approach to threat assessment and 
presents an overall threat assessment value that is based on both the System Effectiveness and 
the Possibility of Attack.  Furthermore, when this threat assessment value is input into the overall 
risk equation (Equation 1), Risk now becomes a function of all three inputs, Possibility of 
Attack, System Effectiveness, and Consequence, therefore risk is no longer solely driven by the 
consequence of the attack.   
 
MLE modeling is effective as demonstrated by using an existing vulnerability assessment that 
used the RAM-W methodology and comparing those results to the MLE model results.  
However, limitations exist regarding the variety of comparisons since the RAM-W and MLE 
model did not exactly compare the same scenarios of attack and weapons used.  Future work in 
this area is required.  The MLE model also depicted a correlation between actual events that have 
occurred based on the AwwaRF study (Welter, 2003) as shown in the calibration graphs 
discussed previously.  
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MLE modeling is not limited to water distribution systems, but is applicable to any type of threat 
assessment.  This methodology is a valuable tool for being able to determine the possibility of 
attack since most current methods for calculating Pa use a worst-case scenario setting Pa equal to 
one.  Therefore, when using the risk equation (Equation 1), the overall risk is consequence 
driven.  Since using this methodology is very conservative, there can be consequences to this in 
terms of increased costs for protection methods that may not be necessary if the threat of it 
actually occurring is very low.    
 
Future work for continual development of the MLE model for water systems includes adding 
additional attributes to the model.  Specifically an important addition to this model would be the 
addition of SCADA operations.  Moreover, further resolving the Security Environment attributes 
may be beneficial in order to determine a more all-encompassing assessment of the Security 
Environment at a water utility.  For example, additional input values regarding how water utility 
funds are spent, e.g. on security upgrades or other site necessities.  Other inputs can be items like 
whether or not background checks are conducted on utility personnel, and more specific inputs to 
the overall utility culture of the site.   
 
There are still some limitations regarding the MLE model, in particular within the Assailant 
Efforts side of the model regarding how much effort an assailant has to devote to an attack based 
on the weapon used.  This portion of the model is ranking events such as an insider 
contaminating a tank with a biological or chemical agent as 0.76, not very difficult.  However, 
the weapon that is used in this scenario is difficult to access; therefore, the Assailant Efforts 
should be higher in cases where the weapon is not easy to access.  Possible solutions to this 
problem are influencing the Assailant Efforts equation based on the means, similar to the way the 
Possibility of Attack is aggregated.   
 
Additional future work to the MLE model should include other types of calibration methods.  
One method in particular that would be useful is collaborating with water utility professionals to 
work through the list of 72 scenarios to rank them in their professional judgment on what the 
highest to lowest threats are, in addition to ranking of the possibilities of these attacks.  This type 
of calibration would then allow a comparison between the outputs of the MLE model vs. water 
utility professional’s opinions to determine if the MLE is ranking threats in a reasonable order.  
Supplementary to this collaboration, the MLE methodology could be piloted with water utility 
personnel to determine, from a water utility operator’s viewpoint, the overall ease, and use of the 
MLE model.   
 
Finally, other work that can be conducted is to develop standard input values for the assailant 
and weapon portions of model so that users are only concerned with the asset.  Most of this has 
been completed, however, it may need some refinement to include additional assailants with 
varying weapons, capabilities and goals.  Weapon values for most biological and chemical 
contaminants have already been determined from the Teter report (2003).  Lastly, scenarios that 
include teaming of assailants should be considered, e.g. an insider teamed with a terrorist.  These 
types of teams can have significant impacts on the success of an attack.  
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APPENDIX A:  MLE THREAT ASSESSMENT MODEL & ELICITATION 
GUIDES 
 
The MLE excel model file with all associated elicitation guides can be requested from the author.  
The elicitation guides are located within the individual worksheets of the Excel file named 
“FinalThreatModel13Nov2005.xls”.  Note:  Macros must be enabled in order to use the GUI 
interface to input and output scenarios.  
 
100 
101 
APPENDIX B:  THREAT ASSESSMENT DATA & SENSITIVITY AND 
IMPORTANT ANALYSIS 
 
This section includes all data used to determine the threat assessment of a scenario.  It is on a CD 
that can be requested from the author.  This workbook includes all the input data and output data 
for all scenarios using a high and low utility environment.  It also includes all data associated 
with the MLE sensitivity and importance analysis.  
The file name is AllHighLowAsmtsDataAndSenImpAnalysis.xls.   
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